SNU ASIA-AFRICA FORUM

Africa in a Multipolar World and Navigating Africa - Beyond Statehood

2024. 01. 29. Seoul National University Asia Center Youngone Hall(Room 210)



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Keynote Speech

The History and Landscape of African Studies in Japan and Kyoto

Motoki Takahashi, Professor and Director, Center for African Area Studies Kyoto University/Professor Emeritus, Kobe University



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0. Prologue: Pre-war Area studies

- Imperialist academism and area studies
 British and French area studies: strongly connected with colonialist rules ⇒
- Colonial (Policy) Studies in Japan


⇔ Pre-war Japan's academic knowledge on Asia and Africa

• Colonial Studies: positioned as a major subject in Schools of Economics to academically underpin pre-war Japan's imperialist policy

0. Prologue: Pre-war Area studies

• Prof. Tadao Yanaihara: The most preeminent Colonial Studies professor:

The first academic who established Colonial Studies as objective science (applied Leninist view of Imperialism). **Tokyo Imperial University** Professor and devout Christian: ethically influential in the society



https://ainogakuen. ed.jp/academy/bible /kate/00/yanaihara.l ife.html

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0. Prologue: Pre-war Area studies

- Prof. Yanaihara ⇒ critical of the empire's disrespect of non-Japanese and injustice of invasion
- In 1937, deported from the university by censure by pro-invasion colleagues in School of Economics
- Other Colonial Studies professors opted for silence; mobilized for cooperation in the war.

1. Post-war Academism and Africa

- 1945 \sim Academics' grave regret for the past = "We could not resist as Yanaihara"
- Despite Yanaihara's return to the university and assumption of the presidency, Colonial Studies disappeared in all the universities' curriculum ← order by the occupied forces.
- Prof. Tobata, the successor of Yanaihara became the founding father of Institute of Developing Economies (IDE, Aji-ken), established in 1958.

1. Post-war Academism and Africa

- Due to grave regret and commitment in academic freedom, Prof. Tobata made efforts to insulate IDE from demands from the government.
- IDE became a large-scale research organization and a cradle for social



http://gauss0.livedoo r.blog/archives/9817 835.html

scientific studies on new nations in Asia and Africa.

 He urged young researchers to go to and stay in developing countries to learn language and culure first
 KYOTO UNIVERSITY and then make research.

1. Post-War Academism and Africa



Dr. Kinji Imanishi (1902-1992)



Dr. Junichiro Itani (192622000) UNIVERSITY

- In 1958, Dr. Kinji Imanishi, a ecological anthropologist of Kyoto University, organized the first research expedition in 1958 to study great apes in Africa
- He later established "Kyoto University African Research Association" in 1968 with 20 members including Dr. Junichiro Itani, another leading Japanese primatologist
- Their interests were motivated by mostly pure curiosity, which was well embraced by the liberalized post-war society, where academic independence was highly appreciated

1. Post-War Academism and Africa

• Soon after, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies (TUFS) started its linguistic studies. The three, IDE, Kyoto, and TUFS became main pillars of African Studies in Japan. They shared understanding that field researches were essential in African area studies.



They cooperated for foundation of Japan Association for African Studies (JAAS).

• <u>Prioritization of field researches resulted in</u>: accumulation of detailed knowledge, focus on microlevel affairs, often apolitical narrow-mindedness, lack of critical consciousness of poverty and oppression, combined with New Left thoughts ⇒ antipathy toward capitalist development, foreign aid, and big businesses

2. African Studies at Kyoto University

• In Kyoto, under strong leadership of founding fathers such as Imanishi and Itani, African studies spread to various fields: primatology, archeology, ecological and cultural anthropology.




Across 14 graduate schools and research institutes Except social sciences: law, poli.sci. economics

• Some of professors of younger generations achieved world class academic findings in studies on Chimpanzee, Gorilla, human ancestors/archeology, minorities Former KU president Prof. such as nomads and hunter-gatherers Juichi Yamagiwa and his Gorilla mate



2. African Studies at Kyoto University




Prof. Masato Nakatsukasa, Graduate School of Sciences<u>in the suburbs of</u> <u>First discovery of Australopithecus fossil in Kenya</u>



Prof. Shuichi Oyama, Center for African Area Studies <u>Green farming using urban waste in the Sahel (Niger)</u>

Kyoto academics now mostly engaged in field researches in Africa, talking to people, digging human bone fossils or trying to green land through reuse of urban waste. Time after time, getting oriented for solution of social issues.

Partnerships and Research Facilities



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
3. Recent Changes and Kyoto

- After the end of the cold war, new generations in Kyoto and Japan are more concerned about social, political, and economic issues such as poverty, conflicts, state rootlessness, gender and discrimination/human right abuses.
- Social-issue-oriented anthropologists in Kyoto became the nodal point to rally academics from different disciplines and institutions.

3. Recent Changes and Kyoto

- Kyoto (especially Center for African Area Studies) became the center of the comprehensive study on *African Potentials* joined by anthropologists, sociology, linguists, political scientists, economists, education scientists, gender studies researchers, and others.
- Remarkably, the *African Potentials* project involved a lot of African academics such as Francis Nyamnjo, Samuel Moyo, and Yintiso Gebre.


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African Potentials

THE CHALLENGE OF AFRICAN POTENTIALS Conviviality, Informality and Futurity






Knowledge, Education and Social Structure in Africa



Dynamism in African Languages and Literature

TOWARDS CONCEPTUALISATION OF AFRICAN POTENTIALS



KEIKO TAKEMURA AND FRANCIS B. NYAMNJOH

3. Towards Contribution to SDGs

• From reconciliation to contribution

Gradually, after the end of the Cold War, KU African studies academics and JICA with other gov't agencies came closer to each other.

 Younger leading academics further step forward by proactively contributing to SATREPS sponsored by JICA and science/technology agencies.

3. Towards Contribution to SDGs

- SATREPS stands for Science and Technology Research Partnership for Sustainable Development. It is to solve global issues through collaborative international research activities between research institutions in both Japan and developing nations including Africa.
 - Co-création d'une gestion innovante des ressources forestières combinant les méthodes écologiques et les connaissances autochtone
 - Development and Operation Model of Plant-derived Soil
 Additives for Road Disaster Reduction on Problematic Soil"
 - Risk-based Participatory WASH Planning and Citizen-data WASH Statistics for African Peri-urban Settlement

4. Conclusion: Challenges to Social Science

- Japanese social sciences on developing countries have been largely constrained by the past war crimes and antipathy toward the government.
- Engineering/technology-supremacism should have been rectified by sufficient knowledge on social, economic, political contexts.
- Moreover, social scientific African studies in Japan should be able to contribute to African development, as the nation is the first industrialized one in the non-Western world.

4. Conclusion: Challenges to Social Science

- Non-western industrialized nations could understand pains associated with introduction of Western products, technology, institutions, and social/individual values in Africa. East Asians may be able to suggest how to combine external knowledge with indigenous wisdoms/experiences.
- African studies social scientists should:
 - In addition to the above-mentioned, be knowledgeable of his or her own nation's development history: both success and failure

4. Conclusion: Challenges to Social Science

- (continued)
 - Be able to deeply understand circumstances of the African country in question to make Japan's experiences relevant.
 - ✓ Last but not the least, be able to communicate with African intellectuals and educated youth
- It is hoped that the TICAD process, restrained by diplomatic and business demands, will be changed so that it could be a venue for knowledge co-creation between Africans and Japanese, for which Japanese academics are at least partly responsible for.

5. Epilogue: East Asians' common concern/mission about Africa

- Japan, Korea and China may contribute to African development intellectually, as non-Western industrialized nations.
- China suddenly emerged as a gigantic development partner of Africa. However, her financing of infrastructure development in African has been largely misguided as the recent series of heavy indebtedness/defaults of debtor countries clearly demonstrated.

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5. Epilogue: East Asians' common concern/mission about Africa

- China's call for a full-scale resistance against the Western socio-political values would be not very constructive in Africa, where various institutions of Western origin have been embedded in. China was not fully colonized.
- Korea would have advantages here: experienced colonization; memories of development may still be fresh/a lot to tell; can share importance of pluralist democracy, accountability and respects for human rights.

Thank you very much

Motoki Takahashi

Kyoto University/Kobe University



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Session 1 Africa in a Multipolar World

2024 SNU Asia-Africa Forum January 29, 2024.

Africa in Indo-Pacific Era

Jaewoo Choo(Kyung Hee University)

1. Introduction

The mention of China and the United States in Africa often conjures up the image, especially in the journalistic community, of two heavyweights battling for political and economic control. While the two countries compete commercially, especially in trade and for big contracts, both countries compete similarly with all of the world's major trading nations. Chinese-American commercial competition in Africa is no different from Chinese-Indian competition or American-French competition. It is also true that some analysts of China and the United States in Africa see the relationship as largely competitive. For example, Yun Sun at the Brookings Institution in Washington commented that "the fundamental cause of inadequate U.S.-China cooperation in Africa is an underlying sense of zero-sum competition between the two powers on the continent."

Once we leave the commercial arena, however, the situation is much more nuanced. While the governments of China and the United States employ different strategies and tactics in Africa, their interests are surprisingly similar. Leaders of both countries have emphasized that Africa is not a zero sum game in their foreign policy. During his visit to Africa early in 2008, former President George W. Bush commented that he did "not view Africa as zero-sum for China and the United States" and believed both countries "can pursue agendas without creating a great sense of competition." A few months later during a conference at Howard University in Washington on China-Africa relations, then Chinese Ambassador Zhou Wenzhong said that China appreciated President Bush's statement, adding that China and the United States need not pursue a "confrontational, or harmful rivalry, or a zero-sum game"3 in Africa.

Senior officials in both countries subsequently made this point in describing the broader U.S.-China relationship. Chinese Ambassador to the United States, Cui Tiankai, commented in 2014 that "there's so much interdependence and connectivity that relations between major countries are no longer a zero-sum game."4 President Obama's National Security Advisor, Susan Rice, also stated in 2015 that China-U.S. relations are not a zero sum game, for "our capacity to manage our differences is greater than that."

2. The Meaning of Africa in Indo-Pacific to the US and China and Their Respective Policy

The resurgence of the Indo-Pacific in the 21st century has to be viewed in the context of the fact that the world has shrunk immeasurably, thanks to globalization and the unbelievable strides in communication and transportation. Rapidly growing interdependence is fundamentally altering the way nations are interacting with each other. Moreover, the emergence of Asia as the global center of gravity is marked by not merely the emergence of China and India as great powers but also by the fact that the entire region is rising and witnessing unprecedented growth and development. Besides the massive economic boom and prolonged dynamism, the political and security spheres are also undergoing remarkable transformations. As a result, the barriers that segregated the sub-regions within the vast Indo-Pacific region are fast breaking down, leading to the emergence of one large geographic entity comprising the East Indian Ocean and the West Pacific Ocean. For instance, a couple of decades ago, the economic links between Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia were tenuous.

Beijing did not have to worry about either the 'Malacca dilemma' or about the security of trading routes in the Indian Ocean. A rift between Japan and China would have hardly affected Southeast Asia. However, this is not so now. Similarly, India's stakes in East Asia have become so critical today that it has no option but to constantly augment its engagement with the region. India has perforce become a part of the emerging regional security equilibrium. For that matter, one could hardly imagine Japan, China, Malaysia and South Korea sending their naval ships to the east coast of Africa, quite often working with their counterparts from India, USA, and the EU countries in patrolling and conducting counter-piracy operations. Undoubtedly this is because their stakes in the Indian Ocean have become vital.

The Indo-Pacific owes its rise to two important developments. One, the emergence of India as a great power and its growing forays into East Asia besides being a dominant power in the Indian Ocean. As an emerging great power, India is aspiring to play a bigger role in the larger region beyond the narrow confines of its immediate neighborhood. Its formidable military power–equipped with nuclear weapons and a variety of ballistic missiles, a navy that is fast becoming blue-water capable, and an economy that is already the fourth largest in PPP terms with huge untapped potential–will be a major factor in any new architecture that emerges. While New Delhi hardly mattered either in regional security or economics in the aftermath of the Cold War, today virtually no discourse on East Asia is complete without a reference to India. Aside from the USA and Japan, several Southeast Asian countries have been nudging India to play a more proactive role in East Asian affairs. Even China had to concede that India is an East Asian power, and that it could significantly contribute to regional peace and development. Nearly 30 per cent of India's trade is with East Asia, and has been witnessing fastest growth compared to any other region. Some of the top investors in India are from East Asia. No wonder it has signed the largest number of comprehensive economic partnership agreements with East Asian countries, and is poised to be part of the region's mega trading bloc once the RCEP becomes operational.

There is no question now that India's future lies in the Indo-Pacific. Likewise, most robust and a wide variety of strategic and defense cooperation agreements that India has entered into are with the countries of the region—from Indian Ocean island states to East Asian countries. The other reason why the Indo-Pacific is acquiring such salience is because far from being the global backwaters, the Indian Ocean is emerging geostrategically and economically as a pivotal region. For a long time, the Indian Ocean was seen primarily in terms of security issues regarding the trade routes carrying energy to Japan and, to a lesser extent, South Korea.

This has dramatically changed with China's growing dependence on imported energy and natural resources, and East Asia's growing economic links with the rim countries. What is noteworthy is that the Indian Ocean region is emerging as a major growth center in its own right. Besides India, virtually the entire rim is economically one of the most vibrant regions in the world. Stretching from eastern Africa to Southeast Asia, it is endowed with vast natural resources and a rapidly expanding market.

Comprising some 2.6 billion people, this region is home to almost 40 per cent of the world's population, and accounts for 10 per cent of global GDP (about US\$ 6.5 trillion). There is no question that its sea lines of communication are among the world's most important—40 per cent of global trade passes through the Indian Ocean, including 70 per cent of the total traffic

of petroleum products.

Touted as the new frontier, the rise of Africa is also likely to considerably increase the Indian Ocean's overall significance in the coming years. It is the fastest growing continent at present. In the wake of Africa's emergence, one aspect that has caught the attention of the world is the new-found interest in Africa by the rising Asian powerhouses, especially China and India (more recently Japan too), and their fast-expanding footprint. These powers are moving from the margins to center stage in Africa, upstaging European powers that have held sway since the days of colonization. This only means that the Indian Ocean's importance will be further boosted. There seem to be some misconceptions that the idea of the Indo-Pacific has been created to contain or constrain China, and is designed to marginalize it in the new discourse. Both assumptions could not be more erroneous. In the same way, because Southeast Asia is at the heart of the Indo-Pacific, its geostrategic importance will be further enhanced. Of course, since great power interests converge most profoundly in this region, they are invariably bound to overlap which, in turn, could give rise to competition and a clash of interests. However, that is not unique to the Indo-Pacific, and has been a prominent feature of East Asia anyway.

Critical to any country's foreign policy are its interests in another country or region. It is important, however, to be clear about definitions when we speak of interests. This analysis refers to hard interests, i.e. what China and the United States want from Africa, not what they can do for Africa or would like to see occur in Africa. Both countries support, for example, economic development and poverty alleviation in Africa. While both countries strive to achieve these goals, they are not what China and the United States want from Africa and, therefore, they do not fit the definition of Chinese and American interests used here.

By that standard, China mainly has five interests in Africa, of which the relative importance to China may vary with time and situation:

- To ensure continuing access to oil, minerals, hardwood timber, and agricultural products.

- To obtain political and economic support from as many as possible of Africa's 54 countries.

- To end Taiwan's diplomatic presence in Africa. (Three countries still recognize Taiwan as an independent state.)

- To increase Chinese exports to Africa.

- To minimize the impact of terrorism, international crime, narcotics trafficking, and piracy so they do not harm China's presence in Africa and the homeland.

The United States also has five major interests:

- To ensure continuing access to oil and a few specialized products.

- To obtain political and economic support from as many as possible of Africa's 54 countries.

– To increase U.S. exports to Africa.

- To minimize the impact of terrorism, international crime, narcotics trafficking, and piracy so they do not harm the U.S. presence in Africa and the homeland.

– To maintain access for U.S. military aircrafts to fly over and land in African territories and for U.S. Navy ships to call at African ports.

It can be seen that the interests of China and the United States in Africa are surprisingly similar. The two countries have four interests that are essentially the same. China has one unique interest, the universal acceptance of the "One China" policy and eventual diplomatic recognition by all African countries, while the United States has a military-security interest that China is yet to pursue to a similar extent. Although the need for the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Navy to access African ports is approaching, and China has acknowledged that it is discussing with the government of Djibouti concerning the establishment of some kind of military support facility there, its military presence as well as security ambition in Africa will remain far behind the United States in the foreseeable future.

Arguably, it has been putting Africa ahead of Latin America and the Middle East, although both of these regions are gaining in importance vis-à-vis Africa. One reason for strong ties with Africa dates back to Africa's support for the Chinese mainland in 1971 to replace Taiwan in the United Nations. The large number of countries in Africa and the fact that they are major sources of key raw materials for China subsequently added to the continent's importance. American democracy, on the other hand, does not lend itself to long term strategic thinking. Political power changes every four or eight years in the executive branch and rarely do administrations develop foreign policies that can be assured of lasting beyond four years. Sometimes administrations have trouble thinking even beyond the next year.

The American democratic system places considerable power in the hands of the Congress as foreign policy decisions require funding, making it more difficult to plan ahead with certainty. Advocacy and special interest groups can also have an enormous and unpredictable impact on foreign policy initiatives. Being a relatively young nation, the United States does not have a history of sweeping foreign policy strategic concepts. Isolationism, anti-communism or containment, and more recently support for democratization and an emphasis on counterterrorism tend to be mid-term strategies at most.

The United States attaches a great deal of importance to North Africa, especially Egypt. For operational purposes, however, the United States considers North Africa as part of the Middle East. Of all major world regions, Sub-Saharan Africa has always been at the bottom of U.S. foreign policy priorities. While there is a reasonable explanation for this situation, the fact that China accords Africa a somewhat higher priority gives it an advantage when comparing relative attention to the continent with the United States. China published its first comprehensive policy document on Africa in 2006. It has subsequently updated this document with periodic high-level statements and by an action program every three years, developed during meetings of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). The last FOCAC Summit occurred in December 2015 in Johannesburg, South Africa. At this event, China issued its second Africa policy paper, which further clarified China's policy, taking into account new circumstances in the relationship.

China's 2015 policy white paper makes the following key points:

- The "One China" principle remains a precondition for the establishment of relations with African countries.

- China will work more closely with the African Union and African subregional organizations.

- Both sides will intensify high-level exchanges, intergovernmental consultation and cooperation mechanisms, as well as exchanges between legislative bodies, political parties, the military, and local governments.

 Both sides will expand exchange and cooperation in cultural, economic, public security and other fields.

– China will prioritize support for Africa's industrialization and agricultural modernization. It will increase development assistance to Africa without political strings attached, following guidelines contained in the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

- China will help promote peace and security in Africa by deepening military cooperation and supporting Africa in combating non-traditional security threats such as piracy and terrorism.

- China will support African countries in public health systems, education and human resource development, poverty alleviation, science and technology knowledge sharing, as well as

climate change and environmental protection.

Since the end of World War II, the United States has periodically issued policy papers dealing with both Sub-Saharan and North Africa. Some of the themes have continued from one presidential administration to another while others are unique to a particular administration.

The United States most recently outlined its policy toward Sub-Saharan Africa in a statement from the White House on 14 June 2012.10 The key points were:

- Strengthen democratic institutions in Africa by promoting accountable, transparent and responsive governance and supporting leaders who create vibrant democratic models.

- Promote human rights, civil society, independent media, and strong democratic norms and ensure a sustained focus on the credibility of democratic processes while addressing humanitarian crises.

- Spur economic growth, trade, and development by supporting programs that enable an environment for trade and investment, and enhance low emissions growth, as well as build resilience to climate change.

- Encourage development by addressing poverty, food security, public health, and opportunities for women and youth.

– Promote African regional integration and encourage more transparency and efficiency in the use of donor aid and management of public finances.

– Expand the African capacity to access and benefit from global markets and encourage U.S. companies to trade with and invest in Africa.

– Support United Nations and African peacebuilding and peacekeeping missions, and help counter terrorism in Africa and advance regional security cooperation and security sector reform.

- Prevent transnational criminal threats and conflict and mitigate mass atrocities and hold perpetrators accountable.

3. Strategic Value of Africa to Major Indo-Pacific Actors

The relentless quest for dominance in the Indo-Pacific region has been extended to the eastern shores of Africa, with Djibouti emerging as the focal point. Indeed, nowhere is the notion that Africa has become the so-called playground in the geopolitical competition of the world's major powers more clearly borne out than in the tiny African state of Djibouti. The country now hosts a congregation of foreign military bases belonging to the great powers, namely China, France, and the US, and middle powers including Japan and Italy. Russia would have been in the mix had its request to set up a military base of its own been accepted by the Djiboutian government in 2014.

Djibouti turned down Moscow's request apparently at the behest of the US, whose relationship with Russia took a turn for the worse following the latter's annexation of the Crimean province of Ukraine in 2014. Djibouti's location along and with direct access to the Bab el-Mandeb strait, which connects the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, and its relative political stability (since the end of the civil war in 2001) have made it a prime location for foreign military bases of those countries seeking to protect their strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific and project their power.

The Bab el-Mandeb strait lies along one of the world's busiest shipping lanes which carries an estimated 10 percent of world trade (about a fifth of the trade that moves through the Indo-Pacific). Millions of tons of oil, petroleum and agricultural products pass through the Bab el-Mandeb headed for Europe, the US and Asia. This makes the corridor highly strategic as its disruption would have a devastating impact on the global economy. Yet, implicit in the description of Djibouti (and the broader African continent) as a playground for the great powers in the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific, is the assumption that it is not a player – thus divesting it of its agency. While such an argument does not lack merit, it is not an entirely accurate characterization of Djibouti's position. Djibouti's military base diplomacy is a deliberate foreign policy strategy that is more an expression than a capitulation of its sovereignty.

Maintaining cordial relations with its neighbours in the Horn of Africa and the Middle East, and the deliberate engagement of major global powers in both bilateral and multilateral settings, have defined the contours of Djibouti's foreign policy. Djibouti's foreign policy is anchored on the maintenance of its sovereignty, the survival of the ruling bloc, and economic growth. The Djibouti Vision 2035 document outlines plans to transform the country into the lighthouse of the Red Sea and Africa's economic and logistics hub. To that end, military base diplomacy – the leasing of land to the militaries of major Indo-Pacific powers – has emerged as Djibouti's instrument of choice in its interactions with powers like the US, China, France, Japan, and Italy. There has been an argument that the military bases in Djibouti are part of its 'worlding' strategy, which entails "embedding global security networks in its territorial space" with a view to reap

its economic and security dividends.

France

The leasing of land to foreign militaries is not a new policy: it has been at the heart of Djibouti's foreign policy since independence. The small country's very survival as an independent and sovereign state since attaining political independence in 1977 has been due in large part to the presence of the French military in its territory, the former colonial power. Djibouti and France signed a defense agreement in 1977 which allowed the latter to maintain its military presence. In return, the erstwhile colonial power undertook to come to Djibouti's defense should it be subjected to an external attack and to fund part of its budget. The newly independent state would probably have been swallowed by its larger neighbors, Somalia and Ethiopia, who, in addition to their desire to control Djibouti's ports, also had ethnic ties with its major ethnic groups, the Issa and the Afars, respectively. Thus, the 1977 defense agreement allowed France to protect its interests in the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea while also protecting Djibouti from probable annexation.

Although the post-colonial Djibouti leaders could have easily tapped into the global anticolonial sentiment prevailing at that time to evict France's military from their country, it was clear to them that they needed France's support. The defense agreement between the two countries was renewed in 1991, giving France's military a more active role than just being a guarantor against external aggression. The new agreement would see France assume responsibility for Djibouti's maritime and airspace security as well as monitoring of civilian traffic. The two countries renegotiated the defense pact in 2011. Another round of negotiations were commenced in 2021 following the meeting of the French President Emmanuel Macron and his Djiboutian counterpart Ismail Omar Guelleh. Djibouti has enjoyed significant economic and security benefits as a result. In August 2003, the two countries agreed on a US\$36 million annual fee to be paid by France for the military base. This was followed by a US\$82 million aid commitment by the French government in 2006. However, trade between France and Djibouti remains highly unequal, with the latter receiving US\$80 million in imports from France while exporting just under US\$450,000 worth of goods. In terms of security, France played a crucial role in providing Djiboutian forces with logistical, intelligence, and medical support during the country's border conflict with Eritrea in 2008 (Mail & Guardian,

2008). However, the opposition parties in Djibouti who boycotted the 2021 elections on account of an uneven electoral environment, have been lobbying the French government to withdraw from the agreement.

The United States

Djibouti also managed to harness its cordial relations with the US and its geostrategic location to host what is now the US's only permanent military base in Africa. Several factors contributed to President Guelleh's decision to allow the US to establish a military base on its territory. Firstly, the two countries have enjoyed cordial relations since the country achieved independence in 1977. The US has maintained an embassy in Djibouti since 1980 and consistently provided millions of dollars in aid which helped cultivate good relations with the Djiboutian leadership. Its support for the US during the Gulf crisis Moreover, Djibouti had also supported the US during the Gulf crisis of the early 1990s.

The history of cordial bilateral relations between the two countries meant that there was a high level of mutual trust which paved the way for military cooperation. Secondly, Djibouti had just emerged from a devastating ten-year civil war which ended in 2001. The government may have calculated that the presence of the US military would help maintain stability since any uprising would also put the US base in danger. Third, the Djiboutian government embraced the US to diversify its relations with great powers and reduce over dependency on France. The limitations

of France's military capacity were exposed during the civil war as it was not able to stop the rebels. Also, the vicissitudes of France's domestic politics could result in a change of its defense policy which could see it withdrawing its soldiers, thus leaving its former colony exposed.

The presence of the US military base in Djibouti shields the increasingly authoritarian ruling party from Western criticism for its human rights abuses and corruption. Although President Guelleh removed presidential term limits from the country's constitution to allow him to potentially remain president for life, he did not get any direct criticism from the US. Instead, because of mutual Indo-Pacific interests, Djibouti has enjoyed access to US aid and investment which are denied to other less strategic countries with similar human rights and authoritarian records. For example, it is one of the African countries considered eligible for participation in the US Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) which grants its products duty-free access to US markets. Respect for democracy and human rights is one of the conditions for participation in the scheme.

Countries such as Zimbabwe, Mali, Guinea, and Ethiopia have been barred from AGOA on allegations of human rights abuses. However, Djibouti seems to be exempt. The US has sent over US\$330 million worth of official development assistance to Djibouti since the military base was opened. This is in addition to the US\$63 million in annual rent the US pays the Djiboutian government for the use of military facilities. This makes up a significant share of the government revenue. Moreover, the US spends hundreds of millions of dollars on local procurement, in wages to about 1200 local employees and the provision of social services. Thus, notwithstanding its highly asymmetric relationship with the US, Djibouti has managed to navigate its relations with Washington in a way that enhances its interests in the Indo-Pacific without sacrificing its sovereignty and autonomy.

Japan

Djibouti also leased military bases to Japan and Italy in 2011 and 2014 respectively. Japan's base, which hosts about 180 soldiers, was established following the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) it signed with Djibouti in 2009. The stakes could not be higher for Japan as 1700 of its commercial vessels carrying the country's automobile exports pass through the Bab el-Mandeb strait. Moreover, the third biggest economy in the world gets the bulk of its oil imports from the Middle East, making a military presence in the region imperative. In 2016, Japan confirmed that it was going to expand its military base by 3 hectares in addition to the original 12 hectares to make room for extra personnel, additional aircraft, and armored vehicles.

The SOFA has been criticized for undermining Djibouti's sovereignty since it exempts Japanese soldiers from being subjected to the Djiboutian legal system. Perhaps this is something that the Guelleh administration was willing to trade for prospective Japanese investments, aid, and the annual fees for the military facility reported to be US\$30 million. Further, the additional security provided by the Japanese patrol boats makes Djibouti's ports all the more competitive. The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) has been channeling significant amounts of aid to Djibouti. In May 2023 JICA availed a US\$4 million grant to be used to secure medical equipment for hospitals. In 2021, another US\$26 million

grant was availed under the Maritime Security Capacity Improvement Plan, which included the building of two patrol boats and a floating pier for the Djiboutian Coast Guard. As such, Djibouti's foreign policy objectives of security and economic development are being realized in its interactions with Japan.

The People's Republic of China

Perhaps the most controversial part of Djibouti's military base diplomacy was its decision to allow China, the US and Japan's foremost geopolitical rival, to build its own military base in the country. China and Djibouti signed a defense and security agreement in 2014, the same year the US extended its lease, which paved the way for China's People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to refuel in one of Djibouti's ports. This move was, rather unsurprisingly, strenuously protested by the US. In 2015, China and Djiboui agreed for the former to build its first overseas military base, the PLA Navy and Logistics Support Base, which opened in 2017.

Renting the base reportedly costs US\$20 million annually. The Chinese base is located about 10 kilometers northwest of the US military base and a stone-throw away from the Chinesebuilt Doraleh Multipurpose Port. It has the capacity to house 10,000 personnel and is endowed with state-of-the-art air, maritime and land capabilities. Djibouti's decision to lease land to China knowing very well that the US, Japan, Italy, and France would not like the move was a demonstration of its foreign policy autonomy.

It is evidence that in Djibouti's foreign policy, practical cooperation takes precedence over ideological considerations. When asked about the Chinese base in 2016, President Guelleh responded by saying that "China has a right to defend its interests just like everyone else". Mr. Guelleh also claimed that his country would like to emulate Singapore in terms of being a logistics hub.

China's insistence on non-interference in the internal affairs of other states and its appetite for investment in big infrastructure projects were enough to persuade Djibouti to accept its request for a military base. However, one can only speculate how much Djibouti's over US\$1 billion debt to China was a factor in acceding to the Chinese establishment of a military base.

Djiboutian leaders believed that Chinese finance would help them achieve their vision of Djibouti as the Red Sea lighthouse of Africa. This seems to have paid off handsomely as China has brought in significant investments to Djibouti. Some of the big Chinese-funded infrastructure projects include the US\$4 billion Addis Ababa-Djibouti standard gauge railway completed in 2017, the building of the US\$580 million Doraleh Multipurpose Port in 2018, and the construction of the Djibouti International Free Trade Zone (DIFTZ), whose pilot phase was completed in 2018 at a cost of US\$370 million.

There have been accusations that China is engaging in debt trap diplomacy with Djibouti where the latter would be forced to relinquish its sovereignty when it fails to service its debt. On his visit to Djibouti in 2019, French President Emmanuel Macron was quoted as saying his government "wouldn't want a new generation of international investments to encroach on our historical partners' sovereignty or weaken their economies".

However, no evidence has thus far been presented to prove that China has used Djibouti's debt to manipulate the Djiboutian government. The two countries' Indo-Pacific interests seem to be compatible. On the one hand, China feels it can protect its interests by establishing a strategic footing in Djibouti. On the other, Djibouti can benefit from China's unconditional financing to realize its vision of being the 'African Singapore'. Unlike China, the other countries with military bases in the country – France, Japan, Italy, and the and the US – simply do not have the means at their disposal to pump money to back up their geostrategic goals.

4. Conclusion

Much of the public discussion on China in Africa has focused on the degree to which China is competing with or even trying to replace the influence of the United States and Western countries in Africa. There is, of course, commercial competition and there are some issues in Africa where the United States and China disagree, which may give the impression of greater competition than the situation justifies. For example, there were disagreements in 2005–2006 over the best approach to end conflict in Sudan's Darfur region. China supported the position of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir while the United States placed sanctions on Sudan. China and the United States also disagreed in 2011 over policy toward Libya and the future of the Muammar al-Qaddafi regime.

The United States uses its leverage in Africa to encourage improvements in human rights practices and the pursuance of Western style liberal democracy. China, on the other hand, has a policy of no political strings attached to its aid and maintains good relations with African governments whether they are democracies, autocracies, military regimes, or Islamist. This is arguably the biggest difference in Chinese and American policy toward Africa.

China is stepping up its bilateral security relationships with Africa as it expands the size and role of the PLA Navy. This has led to a significant increase in port calls in Africa. Should the outcome of China's negotiations with Djibouti or other African countries result in a formal military base, it may raise eyebrows in Washington even though the United States has a large base in Djibouti and drone surveillance operations elsewhere.

The nature of Washington's reaction will probably be determined by the purpose and size of any Chinese military facility in Africa. More importantly, there are numerous areas in which China and the United States are cooperating or have the potential to cooperate. In Africa, both countries generally seek political stability, economic development, and the minimization of negative developments such as terrorism, piracy, narcotics trafficking, and international crime. Both support UN and African Union peacekeeping efforts and international efforts to combat piracy.

The two countries have collaborated in efforts to encourage stability and reduce conflict in Sudan, South Sudan, and Somalia. China was instrumental in convincing President Bashir of Sudan to accept a hybrid African Union/United Nations peacekeeping force in Darfur, where Chinese peacekeepers subsequently were assigned.27 Both countries have backed policies at the United Nations that support the Somali Federal government. They have also provided financial assistance to the African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia aimed at combating extremism.28

China and the United States are part of the same group, which includes the United Kingdom and Norway that supports the Intergovernmental Authority for Development mechanisms for achieving peace in South Sudan.29 There is great potential for cooperation in economic development as well. The United States and China have unique strengths, for example, in working together to help improve African agriculture and health care.

Countering malaria is a scourge where both the United States and China can add value to prevention programs. Both countries have successful agricultural sectors, components of which could be combined and adapted to improve production in Africa. The prevention of natural disasters and provision of emergency relief are other areas where the two countries can cooperate to the advantage of African countries. The time has come to focus more on areas of

current or potential collaboration and to pay less attention to the debilitating debate about U.S-China competition. But U.S.-China cooperation is most likely to happen if African leaders take the initiative and encourage both countries (and perhaps others) to collaborate on specific projects.

In conclusion, there are definitely issues in Africa where China and the United States compete as major powers of the world, but there are many more fields where they can- and shouldcooperate. Africa is neutral territory for both the United States and China. It is the one major region of the world that best lends itself to cooperation. While there are more significant disagreements between the United States and China unrelated to Africa, it should be possible to sideline these differences when it comes to Africa. It is in large part up to African leaders, however, to make such cooperation possible.

Impact of the U.S.'s Indo-Pacific Strategy on Africa's Security and Korea's Diplomacy

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Abstract

The United States' security strategy towards Africa is transforming. Whereas the Obama administration prioritized containing China in the Asia-Pacific by scaling back military involvement in Africa and emphasizing economic and diplomatic overtures, the Biden administration, acknowledging Africa's resurgent geopolitical and strategic significance, is expanding its Indo-Pacific strategy to incorporate the African continent, unequivocally signaling a renewed commitment to re-engagement. This policy shift is shaped by the activist Africa agendas of China and Russia - China is undertaking sundry security cooperation initiatives encompassing peacekeeping support, constructing naval bases to consolidate maritime footholds, arms transfers, and military training to countervail the U.S. and amplify political leverage, while Russia is augmenting its military and diplomatic sway by furnishing security capabilities through paramilitary organizations to African nations embroiled in civil wars and insurgencies. The impetus for according priority to Africa is that African countries receiving security assistance from authoritarian regimes engender a predicament regarding multilateral security cooperation – as exemplified by South Africa and 16 other African nations abstaining from the March 2022 UN resolution criticizing Russia's invasion of Ukraine, confounding the U.S. and Western allies. The U.S. is tasked with making amends for neglecting African countries, accordingly evolving its Indo-Pacific strategy inherited from the Asia-Pacific framework. This article elucidates the evolving African security cooperation milieu becoming an arena of great power rivalries and examines how the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy shapes African security, furnishing implications for Korea-Africa military cooperation.

Key Words: Indo-Pacific Strategy, US-China Competition, African Security Dilemma, Korea's Africa Diplomacy

I. INTRODUCTION

In January 2024, John Mearsheimer, a realist international relations scholar in the United States, argued that the unipolar era that began with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 came to an end in 2017. The Ukraine war is a clear vestige that signals the beginning of a multipolar era, and the liberal international order led by the United States is now a thing of the past that can only be seen through the rear-view mirror. Today we are living in a realist international order (Mearsheimer, 2024). The three major powers in this multipolar era are the United States, China, and Russia, and the international politics of these great powers is now unfolding vigorously on the African stage.

In 2012, the Obama administration of the United States released a new national defense and diplomacy policy paper titled Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century, which promised to maintain the status of the world's strongest military while pursuing global leadership and a leaner military. The Asia-Pacific strategy articulated in this policy paper aimed to contain China's rise by pivoting to Asia so that the United States could maintain its hegemonic status in the Asia-Pacific region. To this end, the United States focused its diplomatic and security efforts on four pillars: first, strengthening alliances with traditional allies like Japan, South Korea, and Australia to contain China; second, incorporating India as a central pillar of the Asia-Pacific order to contain China; third, enhancing relations with ASEAN countries to expand U.S. influence in the South China Sea; and fourth, strengthening U.S. influence through economic revitalization and increasing regional trade and investment. The Indo-Pacific strategy of the Obama administration expanded to the Indo-Pacific strategy after the emergence of the Trump administration, and now under the Biden administration, it is incorporating Africa into its scope (Mawdsley, 2022; Muekalia, 2021).

With the outbreak of the Ukraine war in 2022, a competitive courtship of Africa, which holds the casting vote in multilateral diplomacy, has unfolded. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, French President Emmanuel Macron, and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz toured sub-Saharan Africa, and in December of the same year, U.S. President Joe Biden invited nearly 50 African leaders to Washington for the U.S.-Africa Summit to regain U.S. influence in Africa, which had been wrested by China over the past decade. In January 2023, U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang, and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov all visited Africa in the same month, engaging in a diplomatic battle (KBS 2023).

The intensified diplomatic competition by major powers to win Africa's heart stems from looking beyond the perspective of simple hegemonic rivalry among imperial powers and examining Africa's geopolitical dynamics, how great power international politics affects African security and the resulting security dilemma in Africa. Africa is strengthening its influence in international decision-making through strategic calculations rather than taking sides between the U.S.-Western democratic bloc and the China-Russia authoritarian bloc amid the U.S.-China hegemonic competition. The U.S. geostrategic security policy called the Asia-Pacific strategy has evolved and developed into the geopolitical Indo-Pacific strategy encompassing the Indian Ocean and Africa. Considering that existing research on African diplomacy in Korean society has focused relatively more on economic aid and development cooperation, this paper examines the impact of the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy on Africa with a focus on military security cooperation amid the changing security environment and delivers implications for Korean diplomacy preparing for the 2024 summit with African countries.

II. Great Powers' Africa Security Policies

1. U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy and Africa Security Policy

In February 2022, the Biden administration announced the "U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy", laying out a basic strategic framework for the Indo-Pacific region. The key principle is to pursue "connectivity", "prosperity", "security", and "resilience" with regional allies for a "free and open" Indo-Pacific (White House 2022a). The Indo-Pacific strategy differs from the Asia-Pacific strategy in that it is a

geopolitical concept rather than a geographical one. In essence, the Indo-Pacific strategy is the U.S.'s traditional maritime strategy connecting the Pacific, Indian Ocean, and Atlantic to contain China's attempted changes to the status quo and expansion of influence (Moon 2023). Given that African countries bordering the Indian Ocean share key challenges such as maritime security, geopolitical competition, and climate change, the geopolitical importance of Africa is increasing, making expansion of the Indo-Pacific strategy inevitable (Sneyd 2022).

During the Cold War era, U.S. Africa security policy focused on two goals maintaining regional stability and preventing the spread of communism. Maintaining regional stability entailed supporting local security agencies to protect civilians and mediate conflicts between countries amidst the turmoil following African nations' liberation. Meanwhile, the U.S. competed with the Soviet Union to secure alliances with African countries and provided them with economic and military assistance to strategically manage allies, aiming to secure U.S. security interests and enhance African countries' security capabilities (Brierley 1995).

The Clinton administration, which opened the door to the unipolar era after the Cold War, championed human rights and democratic values but faced criticism for not directly intervening in the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Triggered by ethnic conflicts between Hutus and Tutsis, the massacre lasted 100 days and resulted in 1.17 million deaths. The UN and countries like the U.S., UK, and Belgium were powerless to stop the mass killings, while France faced condemnation for supporting the perpetrator Hutus. The Rwandan genocide prompted the U.S. to pay more attention to African security issues. The Clinton administration was seen as having little understanding of African security issues and lacking interest due to Africa's low priority in U.S. foreign policy.

The Bush administration also initially showed little interest in African security but shifted to an active stance after 9/11 to address terrorism in the region, intervening militarily in Somalia's civil war in cooperation with the Ethiopian government in 2006. However, the U.S.' unprepared military intervention was seen as domestic interference in Somalia, exacerbating factional conflicts and only inflaming anti-American sentiment among Somalis, thus failing. From 2006 to 2007, the Bush Administration cooperated with the Ethiopian government to conduct military interventions to eradicate extremist terrorist groups associated with Somalia's Islamic Courts Union (Malito 2015).

The Obama administration's 2011 Congressional-Mandated Defense Budget Reductions and Strategic Reviews readjusted U.S. global security priorities and sought solutions for economic woes in the U.S. In this process, the U.S. provision of security cooperation to Africa was reduced, and the strategic importance of Africa was re-evaluated by the U.S. in terms of responding to international security and terrorism.

U.S. interest in Africa diminished further when the Trump administration emerged in 2017. Emphasizing America First, Trump did not recognize African interests as connected to U.S. interests. The 2018 National Security Strategy mentioned Africa's strategic importance only as part of its counterterrorism strategy, concentrating U.S. security efforts in the Middle East and Korean Peninsula. Trump was seen as rather neglectful of improving relations with Africa, as he did not make a single visit there during his term.

The period between 2011 and 2020 under the Obama and Trump administrations became a painfully lost decade for the U.S. During this time, China and Russia, through various military and economic cooperation, secured uncatchable influence in Africa for the U.S. In June 2021, President Biden's Strategic Re-engagement report proposed four key policy pillars of 1) strengthening democracy and governance, 2) promoting peace and security, 3) facilitating COVID-19 pandemic recovery and economic development, and 4) building climate change response capacities (Schneidman and Signe 2022). The U.S. Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa released in August states that from the perspective of U.S. national security interests, Africa will play a crucial role in resolving global issues going forward, and that the U.S. will also strengthen partnerships across defense, diplomacy, and development (White House 2022). In December 2022, Biden held the first U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit, inviting leaders from 49 African countries to Washington D.C. and reaffirming the U.S. Agency for International Development's Africa assistance plans (USAID

2022) and reports and hearings by the House Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations.¹ Key examples of the Biden administration's security cooperation are as follows (see Table 1).

The background for the Biden administration expanding engagement with Africa can be summarized as: 1) Africa's strategic value is increasing in addressing global issues like climate change and terrorism; 2) Close security cooperation with Africa is necessary to respond to terrorism concerns following 9/11; 3) U.S. foothold in Africa is narrowing as authoritarian regimes like China and Russia accelerate involvement in African affairs; and 4) Changes in U.S. strategy are inevitable as African countries make progress in self-reliance efforts like creating regional cooperation mechanisms.

When	Security Cooperation	Result
2021.03	Mozambique Terrorism Arbitration	On-going
2021.05	Sanctions against Chad Rebel	Done
2021.11	Ethiopia civil war Arbitration	On-going
2022. 02	Support to implement Peace Agreement in South Sudan	On-going
2022.04	Cyber security cooperation with Tunisia	Done
2022.06	Joint Military Exercise with Morocco	Done
2022.08	Support Military exercise to SADC	On-going
2022. 11	Security cooperation meeting for stabilizing Syria	Done
2022. 12	U.SAfrica Summit	Done
2023.11	Cooperation meeting with President of Angola	Done

<Table 1> Security Cooperation in Africa since Biden came to power (Source: Author Edited)

¹ See Advancing U.S.-Africa Ties: Looking Toward the 2023 Summit (Nov 2022); Fostering Peace and Stability in Sub-Saharan Africa (Apr 2022); Assessing Progress of Select U.S. Initiatives in sub-Saharan Africa (Jun 2021).

2. China and Russia's Africa Security Policies

During the Cold War era, China supported African independence movements under the pretext of anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism and provided economic assistance for infrastructure construction in African countries since the 1960s. In the post-Deng Xiaoping era, China expanded engagement with Africa as part of its reform and opening-up policy and strengthened diplomacy with Africa after the 1973 and 1979 oil crises to diversify oil imports. The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation inaugurated in 1996 focused on exploring African markets and securing resources. After coming to power in 2003, Hu Jintao announced the "China-Africa Cooperation Plan" with massive investments and loans at the 3rd Forum in 2006, widening the gap with the U.S. in African diplomacy and emerging as the most influential power in the region. At the 6th Forum in December 2015, Xi Jinping elevated China-Africa relations to a "Comprehensive Strategic and Cooperative Partnership" and promised to double China's loan and funding support to Africa in the next 3 years to \$60 billion while deepening cooperation in politics, economy, society, security and other areas. By establishing a strategic partnership with the African Union (AU) and accelerating infrastructure investment under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China is strengthening ties. A notable feature of China's cooperation projects under Xi is the recognition of Africa's geopolitical significance, reflected in the emphasis on military cooperation. China has supported air force bases in Zimbabwe, naval bases in Eritrea, Mauritius, and Namibia, the modernization of military barracks in Zambia and Zimbabwe, and the provision of weapons and equipment to countries like Mali and Chad under the intent of reinforcing counterterrorism capabilities (See Table 2).

When	Security Cooperation	Result
2016. 11	Zimbabwe Airforce Base Construction	Done
2017.02	Gambia Military Dormitory Modernization	Done
2017.11	Zimbabwe Military Dormitory Modernization	Done

2019. 11	Eritrea Naval Base Construction	Done		
2020. 09	Provide Weapons and Equipment for Mali Armed Forces	Done		
2021.06	Counter Terror Ops for Chad Government	Done		
2021.12	Burundi Cyber Security Center Construction	Done		
2022. 05	Mauritius Naval Base Construction	Done		
2022. 12	Namibia Naval Base Construction	Done		
2023.08	The 3 rd China-Africa Forum	Done		

Table 2. Security cooperation in Africa since Xi came to power (Source: Author Edited)

Meanwhile, during the Soviet era, Russia provided large-scale military assistance to countries like Angola and Mozambique to expand the communist sphere of influence amid ideological competition with the U.S., and actively exerted influence by dispatching military advisors to countries like Ethiopia and Sudan to strengthen socialist international solidarity. Although its influence in Africa diminished significantly after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has been restoring its foothold since Putin came to power in the 2000s by increasing military cooperation such as arms exports. Putin provided military helicopters to Sudan in 2003, weapons worth \$1 billion to Libya in 2009, and air defense missiles called "Kometa" to Ethiopia the same year. In 2018, Russia provided small arms, grenades, and field medical equipment to the Central African Republic, followed by 4 Su-35 fighter jets to Sudan in 2019 and 2 Mi-17 helicopters to Mozambique. A notable feature of Russia's security cooperation in Africa is the Wagner Group, a paramilitary organization whose activities are condoned by the Russian government. The Wagner Group secured a firm foothold by intervening in the Central African Republic's civil war in 2014, and has undertaken training, reconnaissance, and combat support missions by intervening in civil wars in Sudan in 2018, Mozambique in 2019, and Libya in 2020 (See Table 3). Although the Russian government denies connections, Wagner is essentially a quasi-military organization backed by Russia (Seth 2021).

When	Security Cooperation	Gov/Wagner
2000.02	Russia-Angola Military Cooperation Signing	Gov
2001.06	Russia-Namibia Joint Military Commission	Gov
2002.07	Military Sale to Sudan (Su-29 Fighter jet)	Gov
2003.09	Military Sale to Sudan (Mi-24 Helicopter)	Gov
2009.08	Military Sale to Ethiopia (Kometa Missile)	Gov
2014. 12	Military Intervention to Central Africa Republic	Wagner
2018.01	Military Intervention to Sudan	Wagner
2018.03	Military Sale to Central Africa Republic (Weapons)	Gov
2018.07	Military Sale to Sudan (Su-35 Fighter jet)	Gov
2019.03	Military Intervention to Mozambique	Wagner
2019.04	Military Sale to Mozambique (Mi-7 Helicopter)	Gov
2019.06	Support Haftar forces in Libya	Wagner
2020.09	Strengthening Military Cooperation with Mali Gov.	Gov
2021.04	Joint Military Ops with Mali Armed Forces	Wagner
2022.02	Provide Military Training for Burkina paso Armed Forces	Wagner
2022.09	Invite Algieri Navy to "Vostok" Exercise	Gov
2022.10	Russia-Algieri Joint Navy exercise	Gov
2022.11	Russia-Algieri Joint Army exercise	Gov

<Table 3.> Russia's Security Cooperation in Africa Putin came to power (Source: Author Edited)


3. Great Power Rivalry in Africa

China and Russia's expansion of military cooperation in Africa has triggered a security dilemma by exacerbating the regional arms race and making it difficult to build a united front in the decision-making processes of the African Union (AU). It has also put African countries in a dilemma where they have no choice but to remain silent about the neo-imperialist actions of authoritarian regimes. This dilemma prompted the Washington establishment to improve its awareness of Africa's geopolitical importance. As the analysis emerged that securing dominance in Africa, with its enormous population, resources, and economic potential, is imperative to gain an edge in the global hegemonic competition, the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy is also transforming towards actively engaging Africa (McKenzie 2022).

The Biden administration reconvened the "U.S.-Africa Summit" from December 13-15, 2022, inviting leaders from 49 African countries and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission. This was the first convention in 8 years since 2014. President Biden pledged active support for Africa's future prosperity, emphasizing that "Africa's success is synonymous with global success." In particular, measures to strengthen African security and democracy were discussed, and Biden promised unwavering diplomatic support for Africa to become a G20 member. The U.S. will provide \$55 billion in total over the next three years starting in 2023 to support various areas including climate change, food security, and health, and commit an additional \$2.5 billion to overcome food insecurity. Through a Memorandum of Understanding on enhancing trade cooperation via the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA), it will invest \$170 million to vitalize trade and also signed \$15 billion worth of investment agreements in the public and private sector beyond government assistance (EMERiCs 2022). The U.S.' bolstered cooperation with Africa is seen as a tactic to curb the influence of China and Russia on the continent. China and Russia have already pledged to provide \$40 billion and \$12.5 billion respectively in assistance to African nations by 2021.


support, U.S. aid to Africa does not have political motives or conditions and is not intended to control African countries (Park 2022).

On the other hand, China and Russia's security cooperation with Africa is highly diverse and substantial. Under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China is concentrating investment on transportation, ports, energy, and pipeline infrastructure projects across Africa like the railway from Djibouti with a Chinese naval base to Ethiopia, Kenya's high-speed rail, and Nigeria's Abuja development. Despite criticism that Chinese firms source raw materials, components, and labor locally, benefiting China's economy rather than Africa's, China maintains a good reputation among African nations – surveys by British research firm YouGov-Cambridge Globalism Project in 2022 found 83% of Nigerians, 82% of Kenyans, and 61% of South Africans view China favorably (VOA 2022).



<Figure 1.> Military Sale to Africa in 2000~2019 (Source: Rand Corporation) *million dollar

Russia is actively pursuing military intervention and arms sales through cooperation between the government and private paramilitaries. Figure 1 shows the changing distribution of armsexporting countries to Africa since 2000. Looking at 2015-2019 statistics, the value of Russia's arms exports to Africa has surpassed the U.S. since 2004, accounting for over half of total exports in 2019. Considering unrecorded profits from mining rights in the Central African Republic through military support, Russia's economic gains from military cooperation with Africa are presumed to be substantial. Although the value of China's arms exports to Africa is lower than Russia, France, and the U.S., it has been steadily rising since 2009. Given China's concentration on infrastructure support like building military bases, Africa's security dependence on China is very high.



<Figure 2.> Russia and China's Military Security Cooperation in Africa (Source: RAND Corporation)


Figure 2 illustrates China and Russia's military cooperation – the darker the color, the higher the frequency and intensity of cooperation. Except for Tunisia, Western Sahara, Namibia, and Cameroon marked in grey, all countries receive security cooperation from Russia and China. Especially countries like Mali, Nigeria, Sudan, the Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Angola, and Tanzania obtain arms exports and military security cooperation from both Russia and China through combined governmental and private sector efforts. In particular, the Sahel region south of the Sahara Desert has seen decades of conflict stemming from various political, ethnic, economic, and environmental factors. The problem is that as conflicts spread from the Sahel region to coastal nations, Russia and China's military intervention and security cooperation is also expanding to coastal countries (Tastsu 2023).

<Table 4> summarizes the status of military support and arms exports from China and Russia to African countries. In the table, boxes marked with "R" indicate arms exported from Russia, while boxes marked with "C" denote arms from China. At the top of the chart, "PSC" refers to military cooperation with Private Security Contractors, as well as transactions of aircraft/drones, air defense, artillery, armored vehicles, engineering, missiles, other weapons, surveillance/reconnaissance, and naval vessels (Ibid. 2022). <Figure 3> uses big data to illustrate the complex power dynamics unfolding among major powers in Africa. It analyzes 1,470 issues related to U.S.-China-Russia rivalries exposed online from September 1 to December 21, 2022, demonstrating how the great power rivalry in Africa is intricately intertwined.

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NOTE: UAV = unmanned aerial vehicle.

<Table 4.> China and Russia Military Cooperation in Africa countries (Source: RAND Corpration)




<Figure 3.> Big Data Analysis for Great Power Dynamics in Africa (Source: KIEP and Author Edited)

III. Security Dilemma and U.S. Ind-Pacific Strategy

1. Africa's Security Dilemma

The African continent consists of 54 countries, each composed of diverse ethnic and racial groups. There are hundreds of different ethnicities and races with distinct languages, cultures, and traditions. Due to the history of imperialist division of Africa, dependence on Europe is still high and African countries are very influenced by changes in the international environment. In particular, African nations remain at developing country levels of economic development, making them the most vulnerable group in the 21st century multilateral international order (Lee 2022). African countries, comprising one-third of UN member states, exercise voting power at the UN General Assembly.



<figure 4.> How did African Countries Vote on the UN Ukraine Declaration? (Source: China Global South Project)

Reflecting the influence of China and Russia in Africa, in the 2014 UN resolution vote condemning the annexation of Crimea, the tally was 100 votes in favor, 11 against, and 58 abstentions – African countries Egypt, Algeria, South Africa, Mali, Rwanda, Senegal, and Gabon abstained, while in the March 2022 UN General Assembly vote on a resolution condemning Russia's invasion of Ukraine, South Africa and 16 other African nations maintained a neutral stance by abstaining. Eritrea voted against the resolution together with Russia, Belarus, North Korea, and Syria (See Figure 4). This contradicted declarations by the Chairperson of the African Union (AU), with 24 out of 44 AU member states not voting in favor of the UN resolution (Ibid. 2022). This reveals the difficulty of joint responses by the AU and multilateral institutions like the UN, creating conflict among AU members and posing a dilemma that induces regional security instability.

The divided stance within the African Union was repeatedly revealed in the April 2022 UN Human Rights Council resolution to suspend Russia's membership. The resolution passed with 93 votes in favor, 24 against, and 58 abstentions – among the 24 countries voting against were the Central African Republic and Algeria, which receive security assistance from Russia's paramilitary Wagner Group, while Senegal and South Africa were absent. In principle, Russia's invasion of Ukraine should be condemned by African countries that experienced colonial rule by imperialist powers in the past, but countries receiving military cooperation and security from Russia are unable to speak with one voice along with other African nations due to their unique situation. Libya, Mali, Sudan, and the Central African Republic, which are confronting radical Islamist armed forces and rebels, maintain silence on Russia's invasion as they rely on the military intervention of Russian Wagner mercenaries for their security.

The division of Africa by European imperialist powers and their colonial rule allowed African countries to achieve independence in succession under the post-WWII international order. However, African nations are exposed to security threats like territorial disputes, civil wars, and terrorism, and are preoccupied with military buildup to address security concerns, which conversely exacerbates their security dilemma. Algeria and Morocco over Western Sahara, Ethiopia, and Eritrea over border disputes, Sudan and South Sudan, Uganda and Rwanda, Nigeria, and Cameroon over the Boko Haram issue are engaged in arms races. In particular, tensions are rising between Algeria and Morocco over Western Sahara, and Ethiopia and Eritrea over border disputes. There are also border conflicts between Sudan and South Sudan, and Uganda and Rwanda, while Nigeria and Cameroon are at odds over the Boko Haram problem.

2. Impact of the Indo-Pacific Strategy on Africa

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the U.S. has enjoyed the status of the sole hegemonic power leading the liberal international order. However, during this period, U.S. interest in Africa was relatively lacking compared to China and Russia, as evidenced by the security cooperation examples of the U.S., China, and Russia in Africa provided earlier. Trump did not visit Africa during his term, which has been evaluated as allowing China to expand its influence in Africa (Lee 2022). To respond to terrorism threats and maintain security and stability in the African region, the Bush administration installed the Africa Command (AFRICOM) in 2007. However, AFRICOM headquarters is located in Stuttgart, Germany, and operates distributed bases, limiting direct intervention in Africa – all African countries except Liberia refused to host AFRICOM (IHT 2008).

Under the Obama administration, as the U.S. shifted the central axis of its rapidly growing diplomatic and military policy toward Asia (rebalancing), it reduced ground forces and military intervention in the Middle East and Africa while avoiding direct involvement in terrorism and civil war threats in the African region, pivoting to providing necessary capabilities through partnerships with countries concerned. Accordingly, the scale of military training and equipment support to African countries was drastically cut, concentrating on humanitarian aid and development assistance. The Trump administration expanded security and economic cooperation to compete with China's growing influence, but focused security cooperation on responding to terrorism and extremism, and conditioned economic cooperation on purchases of American goods and services, failing to win over African countries due to passive stances on promoting democracy, human rights, and development assistance in the region. The Biden administration held the 2022 U.S.-Africa Summit to expand its influence in Africa, where it lags behind China and Russia and promised an Africa visit in 2023 which remains unfulfilled.

Considering the domestic and international circumstances of the U.S. ahead of the 2024 presidential election, the prospect of expanding U.S. influence in Africa through extending its Indo-Pacific strategy and actively re-engaging is not very promising. Domestically, Biden faces low approval ratings, while Trump is likely to become the Republican candidate amidst a pileup of international security issues like the Ukraine war, the Israel-Hamas conflict, the Iran nuclear problem, and North Korean provocations. U.S. concerns have deepened further with the recent clashes with the Houthi rebels in Yemen.

If Trump returns to power in the 2024 U.S. presidential election, China and Russia's influence in Africa is forecasted to grow stronger. The 2020 Congressional Research Service report "Renewed Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense" shows that Trump emphasized reducing troops in Africa and concentrating security capacity on containing China in India and the Pacific region (2022). Under Trump, security cooperation with Africa focused on responding to terrorism and extremism, while economic cooperation was conditioned on purchases of U.S. goods and services and took passive approaches to promoting democracy, human rights, and development assistance, failing to win over African countries. Trump was also criticized for disparaging remarks about Africa during his inauguration and neglecting Africa as he did not visit during his term.

IV. Conclusion: Implications for Korea's Africa Diplomacy

The implications for South Korea's diplomatic and security cooperation with Africa are significant given that the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy is an expanded version of the Asia-Pacific strategy reflecting geopolitical dynamics. India and Africa face each other across the Indian Ocean, and in the Indo-Pacific strategy connecting the Indian and Pacific Oceans, the U.S. cannot address Africa separately as South Korea is a key country in the strategy.

As the security competition between the U.S., China, and Russia unfolds in Africa, resolving conflicts between regional nations does not seem easy. The vicious cycle of prolonged civil wars and strengthened terrorism continues, increasing instability. Security woes lead regional countries into the quagmire of fierce arms races, and African nations receiving military security assistance from authoritarian states end up exercising their voting rights against international common sense – an ironic scene for Africa with a painful history of imperialist aggression being forced into silence amid the emergence of neo-imperialism.

In 2024, the Yoon Suk-yeol administration of South Korea is preparing to meet with African leaders. The Korea-Africa Forum, which had been held at the ministerial level, will be upgraded to a summit and the Korea-Africa Summit is slated for 2024. Recognizing the growing prominence of the "Global South", it is worth welcoming that Africa is being re-evaluated as a resource treasury and

pivotal global country for South Korea's contribution diplomacy. Since the 2000s, South Korea's diplomatic approach to Africa has concentrated on economic aid and development cooperation, with the most notable security cooperation case being the participation of peacekeeping troops in South Sudan as a member of the UN. Now, South Korea should designate its Africa-friendly major countries as new strategic cooperative partners to discover and implement comprehensive measures to enhance security cooperation (Shim 2012).

From Africa's perspective, South Korea is seen as a non-hegemonic nation with sufficient capabilities to assist in Africa's reconstruction. As economic and security cooperation with China and Russia intensifies, debt repayment pressures on infrastructure investment and concession of key mineral resource development rights are generating unfavorable African public sentiment, allowing South Korea to become a new security cooperation partner for African countries. Looking at the security cooperation cases of the U.S., China, and Russia, South Korea's approach to Africa security cooperation can entail cooperation through regional multilateral institutions as well as bilateral cooperation with key target nations. Cooperation through the African Union (AU) is mostly done via UN peacekeeping activities. As the international community becomes more divided into democratic and authoritarian blocs, requests for South Korea's contributions are expected to increase. Amid rising demands for more participation in peacekeeping operations in African conflict zones, the Ministry of National Defense should meet international expectations in consideration of accurate demand forecasts and defense capabilities.

In addition to the AU, the region has various minilateral communities like the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Southern Africa Custom Union (SACU), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), East Africa Community (EAU), and South African Development Community (SADC). However, due to complex political and economic dynamics, and linguistic and cultural differences between member states, integration faces difficulties and it is not easy to build consensus, resulting in poor implementation of regimes. Hence, direct security cooperation with these minilateral communities is unlikely to be very effective.

South Korea needs to focus on strengthening Africa's autonomous security capabilities, increasing participation in UN peacekeeping activities, and cooperating with the international counterterrorism system. If South Korea perceives conflict zones as potential markets for K-defense and pursues short-term profits through arms exports, it will be difficult to win over African countries. Considering Africa's diversity and particularities, it is also necessary to designate strongholds by region and establish tailored defense cooperation measures. Concentrating on the security cooperation demands of African nations, in the West region, South Korea can provide support centered on cybersecurity, defense IT education, and dismantling of aging ammunition, focusing on Ghana and Nigeria. In the Central region, South Korea can focus on supporting infrastructure such as defense, public order, and information networks, focusing on DR Congo. In the East centered on Ethiopia, South Korea needs to accelerate weapons export cooperation for Suleon helicopters and K-9 self-propelled artillery that began in 2023 on the precondition of Ethiopia terminating military cooperation with North Korea. In the South centered on South Africa, active participation in projects is requested to improve overall systems related to defense, public order, and information networks.

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Draft working paper: please do NOT quote or cite without the author's permission.

Sino-Africa's Cooperation in a Multipolar World

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China has emerged as a regional superpower in recent decades; it led to a change in the world system from a unipolar world order dominated by the West to a multipolar one. Numerous scholars, including realists, have recognized a multipolar world. For example, in the 2022 interview, Mearsheimer argued that the world is "a vestige of Unipolarity....the unipolar moment is over".¹ Stephen M. Walt also admitted the multipolar world, adding that "the Biden administration is striving for a unipolar world that no longer exists" in his column.² China's economic strength, institutional influence, technological prowess, and military might have all increased significantly during the last several decades. China's ability to weaken America's dominance has enabled it to play a crucial role in altering the international order.

The hegemonic competition between the United States and China is also continuing in the African continent. In the 1990s, China embarked on resource diplomacy to make inroads into Africa, but at the same time, with the end of the Cold War, the United States no longer considered Africa to be important. However, since the Obama administration, as a confrontation between the U.S. and China intensified, competition between the two countries has expanded into various areas such as trade, technology, environment, and space, as well as to the African, Central, and South American regions.

In expanding its camp centered on developing countries, the region that China should pay the most attention to is Africa. All 54 countries on the African continent are UN member states as well as a treasure trove of resources and are in geopolitically important locations. China and Africa's relationship started a long time ago. Along with the Ten Principles of Bandung from the Bandung Conference in the 1950s, the relationship with Africa that began was furthered by Deng Xiaoping in the 1970s at the UN, where he introduced Mao Zedong's Third World Theory, emphasizing maintaining amicable relations with Africa and using that as a foundation to expand networks on the international stage.

As to solidarity enhancement among developing countries, the Chinese government has secured a foothold in Africa through various activities, including official development assistance, public diplomacy, trade, investment, infrastructure construction, and finance. Although China does not officially use the term alliance, since Xi Jinping came to power, for the relationship with Africa to be reborn as a community transcending political and economic

¹ Mearsheimer, J.J. (2022). John Anderson Interviews John Mearsheimer. Youtube, 6 January 2022. [Video Interview]. https://www.youtube.com/shorts/h161YB6QTnl [Accessed 15 Feb. 2023].

² Walt, S. M. (2023). America is too scared of the multipolar world. Foreign Policy.

https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/07/america-is-too-scared-of-the-multipolar-world/

cooperation, China is continuing to provide more comprehensive support, both overt and substantial, compared to the past. In the past, even when China's economy was poor, it provided considerable financial support to Africa for causes such as national liberation, anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism, and supporting communist revolutions. However, in the current situation of U.S.-China hegemonic competition, the Chinese government's regional support worldwide and its strategies demonstrate a different appearance compared to the past to expand its influence on the international stage.

Recently, the Chinese government has been utilizing Africa more strategically to demonstrate the validity of the norms and order led by China to the international community, especially in a multipolar world. A prime example is the increasing necessity of Africa as a means to realize the Chinese Dream. As the Belt and Road Initiative has become linked with the Health Silk Road and the Digital Silk Road connected to the 4th industrial revolution, 5G, and Internet of Things (IoT) projects, investment in and entry into Africa by Chinese companies supported by the Chinese government are also noticeably increasing. Also, after Xi Jinping first mentioned the '2060 Carbon Neutrality' declaration in his speech at the 75th UN General Assembly in 2020, China is concentrating more on Africa, which has the world's largest reserves of key minerals for renewable energy and electric trains, in order to secure the minerals necessary to achieve his strategy. Thus, the presentation attempts to cover the contents of Sino-Africa's cooperation in a multipolar world from different angles.

China-Africa: when did their relations begin?

China and Africa's close economic ties first gained global attention in the late 1990s and early 2000s when China actively pursued resource diplomacy in Africa. However, this relationship did not suddenly appear with the arrival of the 21st century but is an extension of China's relations with Africa that began in the 1950s. From a historical perspective, the beginning of China-Africa relations can be traced back to the fleet of Ming dynasty General Zheng He first arriving in Madagascar, East Africa, but the cornerstone of current relations was the 1955 Bandung Conference, also known as the Asia-Africa Conference. Since then, China has shown interest in Africa while striving to build mutually beneficial economic and political relationships.

The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, reiterated at this conference, played a big role in enabling China to establish amicable ties with Africa in the 1960s and 1970s, and they remain the basis of current China-Africa relations. Also, the current close China-Africa relationship, built upon past China-Africa relations, can largely be explained in three stages: The first stage is from the 1950s to the mid-1990s when China-Africa relations were strongly politically motivated. The next stage is from the mid-1990s to before 2010, differing from the past as domestic and foreign political relations stabilized and economic ties between China and African countries developed rapidly. The last stage has been from the 2010s onwards, when, in addition to the advanced economic ties, China and Africa have started to examine new issues requiring consideration, such as how to improve the social responsibility of Chinese companies in Africa, increase China's participation in African peace and security issues, help the West better understand China-Africa relations, and how to protect the interests of overseas Chinese residing in Africa.

The necessity of expanding cooperation with Africa in a multipolar world

China dreams of building a community with a shared future with Africa. The 20th Party Congress clearly demonstrated the position of not backing down in areas of military, security, economy, and ideology, led by the China Dream, which represents the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation that Xi Jinping has emphasized.³ Having risen to the position of absolute power, Xi Jinping will raise China's voice even higher on the international stage going forward and put forth the new international norms led by China more strongly, thereby seeking to increase China's say and decision-making ability regarding major issues.

Africa has long maintained cooperation with China in the international community. Based on the Bandung Declaration in 1953 and the spirit of the Third World, China, and Africa have continuously developed from an allied relationship to a partnership, then a strategic partnership, and currently a comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership. Accordingly, China-Africa cooperation areas have recently expanded from conventional economic and trade ties to digital, finance, and green sectors.

The shared future community, often mentioned in China-Africa relations, also frequently appeared at this BRICS summit. The community of shared future discourse first emerged at the 2010 US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, then expanded into the concept of a community of shared future for humankind (人類命運共同體) under the Xi Jinping administration, concentrating more on strengthening relations with neighboring countries. Also, it emphasizes that to build a community of humankind, humanity as a community of shared future must follow the epochal trend of cooperation, common development, and peace by overcoming difficulties and challenges together, and it is necessary to practice the governance philosophy of 'people-centered development' while promoting universal human values and carry out cooperation and development in areas such as economic and political mutual benefits, civilizational exchanges and mutual learning, peace, and security.

The Cooperation between China and Africa through Multilateral Cooperation Platforms

The main characteristic of China's scheme of cooperation with African countries is through multilateral platforms. China maintains cooperation with Africa in various political, economic, and social areas under the discourse of the community of a shared future. Through the Forum

³ 中华人民共和国中央人民政府. (2022). 习近平:高举中国特色社会主义伟大旗帜 为全面建设社会主义现代化国家而团结奋斗 ——在中国共产党第二十次全国代表大会上的报告. https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2022-10/25/content_5721685.htm.

of China and Africa Cooperation, where 53 out of 54 African countries, or African nations on the African continent participate, it emphasizes the realization of a China-Africa community of shared future and has been promoting African countries' participation in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China's global economic and military territorial expansion project. As if to prove this, as of April 2023, Africa has the most countries, 44, participating in China's BRI global economic and military territorial expansion project. The Chinese government emphasized that the BRI leads to co-development with Africa, infrastructure building, promoting the development of both countries through relations and communication, and expanding eco-friendly green businesses in Africa. It argues that inclusiveness and solidarity among developing countries, embracing diverse models that break away from existing development models, respect for cultural diversity, and pursuing common peace and development are necessary between China and Africa.

The first characteristic of this cooperation direction is that it shares the context and content of the cooperation plans that China has consistently proposed to African countries at the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). Second is building an anti-Western alliance to contain the U.S. amidst intensifying U.S.-China strategic competition. Based on the solidarity and cooperation of South American countries grounded in multilateralism, it mainly consists of cooperation content for realizing peace, sustainable growth, and a fair international order. Against this background, the discussion at this summit on switching payment settlement methods within the region and establishing a payment settlement system foundation among BRICS Plus member countries has attracted great interest.

Recently, the BRICS Plus came to the front as a multilateral platform that is growing rapidly. One of the key elements in realizing multilateralism is leadership among great powers. China has constantly strived to expand China-led multilateralism and has been a major supporter of BRICS expansion. Introducing the BRICS Plus concept for the first time through the 9th Summit last year, the Chinese government went on to consolidate the BRICS Plus concept by introducing the 'Beijing Declaration' for enhancing the representative power of emerging and developing countries at the 15th Summit this year. Such efforts from China have borne fruit. On August 24th, the BRICS, consisting of five emerging economies (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), officially approved six countries - Ethiopia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, and Argentina - as new member states. The BRICS membership has expanded from the original four countries to 11 countries, which is the first time in 13 years since South Africa was last admitted in 2010. Now called the BRICS Plus, with the geopolitical expansion to Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, and South America, the BRICS accounts for about 47% of the world's population, 36% of the global GDP, and 44% of the world's oil reserves.⁴

Regarding China's move to expand multilateralism, U.S. National Security Advisor Jake

⁴ Reuters. (2023, September 29). BRICS expansion will not control 80% of world oil production. Reuters.

https://www.reuters.com/fact-check/brics-expansion-will-not-control-80-world-oil-production-2023-09-29/.

Sullivan said, "BRICS does not appear poised to become a geopolitical competitor to the United States or anyone else" at an unofficial White House briefing⁵. However, unlike his perspective, this summit was held under the theme of 'BRICS and Africa: A Partnership for Accelerated Growth, Sustainable Development, and Inclusive Multilateralism', agreeing that the current strategic partnerships between South American countries will develop into new relationships going forward. Through the consensus document Johannesburg II Declaration, BRICS member countries announced directions of cooperation in six areas (inclusive multilateralism, sustainable development, partnership for mutually accelerated growth, creating an environment for peace and development, deepening people-to-people exchanges, and institutional development) based on the BRICS spirit of mutual respect, democracy, solidarity, understanding, sovereign equality, openness, inclusiveness, consensus, and cooperation.

At this BRICS summit, President Xi Jinping reiterated to the President of South Africa that China and African countries must cooperate more closely to resolve world changes and turmoil. In addition, the leaders of the two countries jointly hosted the 'China-Africa Leaders Dialogue' under the theme of 'Working Together for China-Africa Community with Shared Future' and issued the 'Joint Statement of the China-Africa Leaders Dialogue'. Notably, the joint statement expressed support for the African Union's G20 accession to promote international issues and continuously raise South American countries' international status. Also, China pledged to strengthen dialogue and communication with Africa in various areas through the Belt and Road Cooperation and Forum on China-Africa Cooperation while supporting the development of Africa's governance and financial systems and the integration of institutions within Africa.

A key foreign policy emphasized by the Xi Jinping leadership in its third term since the 20th Party Congress is for China to build a new multipolar order by aligning with South American countries rather than embracing the Western-led liberal international order. At the opening ceremony of the third Belt and Road International Cooperation Summit, President Xi Jinping, alluding to U.S. policy towards China, criticized unilateral political sanctions and reemphasized that the Belt and Road Initiative is a powerful alternative to the U.S.-led world order. Also, the direction China is presenting to Africa is based on building a multipolar international order, mutually beneficial cooperation, common prosperity, and peaceful development for equality in development.

Ethiopia and Egypt, among the new BRICS Plus member states, are member states of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, core Belt and Road Initiative countries, and have forged decades of cooperation with China spanning over 50 years. Whereas Mao Zedong's interest in Africa aimed to contain Taiwan internationally and gain UN membership through African

⁵ The White House. (2023, August 22). Press gaggle by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan.

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/press-briefings/2023/08/22/press-gaggle-by-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-2/

solidarity, the current Xi Jinping era can be seen as achieving China's political and economic goals through a practical and strategic approach. Looking more closely, Nigeria has the largest economy in sub-Saharan Africa. Yet, Ethiopia was selected as a new BRICS member state because, despite having no resources, it boasts a geopolitically advantageous location and great economic growth potential. Ethiopia has the second largest population in Africa, and at the end of 2022, its real GDP was US\$106 billion, having grown at a high average annual rate of 6.0% over the past four years. As a member state of COMESA, one of Africa's largest economic cooperation frameworks, Ethiopia is Africa's sixth-largest economy, even outpacing Kenya's growth rate.⁶ Ethiopia is located just below Djibouti in East Africa. Djibouti lies at the entrance to the Red Sea connecting Europe and Asia, and it is where military powers, including the United States, Europe, and Japan, have built bases. Moreover, as it houses the African Union (AU), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the UN Economic Commission for Africa, and various NGOs, it serves as a diplomatic hub within the African continent. Furthermore, as of 2020, Ethiopia had 138,000 troops, one of the largest armed forces among sub-Saharan African countries.⁷

Egypt is located in North Africa and is a key country in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. As in renowned U.S. diplomat Henry Kissinger's famous words, "You can't make war in the Middle East without Egypt and peace without Syria", Egypt's geopolitical, economic, and military-security importance continues to grow. The Suez Canal connecting the Red and Mediterranean Seas was built in the 19th century with French sponsorship. Despite the development of state-of-the-art modern means of transportation, maritime shipping still occupies an important place in trade, making the Suez Canal a major strategic point capable of expanding land and sea transportation routes. Also, as of 2024, Egypt has the world's 15th-strongest military force.⁸ With a population of over 100 million, it is the most populous country in the Arab region as well as hosts the headquarters of the Arab League, currently serving as chair to mediate conflicts and peace issues in the Middle East and Africa as a central player.

China-Africa's Cooperation: Expectations in the Near Future

As mentioned earlier, the power of the South American region is growing amidst the increasingly multipolar international community. Amidst such changes, China has consistently argued that the U.S.-centric unipolar world order requires a reconfiguration through a new type of great power relations while emphasizing the realization of multipolarity in the

⁶ Sahlberg, A., Usher, W., Pappis, I., Broad, O., Kebede, F., & Walle, T. (2023). Exploring long-term electrification pathway dynamics: a case study of ethiopia. Discover Energy, 3(1). https://doi.org/10.1007/s43937-023-00014-4

 $^{^7\,}$ The World Bank. (n.d.). Armed forces personnel, total - Egypt, Arab Rep. | Data.

https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.TOTL.P1

⁸ Arab News. (2023). Egypt overtakes Algeria as largest gas exporter to Europe.

https://www.arabnews.com/node/2443461/middle-east

international order that respects the sovereignty of each country. The implications of African countries additionally joining BRICS as member states are as follows: At the point when the hegemonic battle between the U.S. and China continues across the African continent, China will utilize BRICS Plus as another platform to contain the United States. The discussion on reducing the proportion of dollar-denominated trade settlements also raised at this summit reflects China's ambition thus far not only for economic gains but also to formally step up containing the United States by using its strengthened alliances with countries that do not pursue anti-China policies, based on key nodes of the Belt and Road Initiative. Also, while many African countries maintain close ties with China, they cooperate with the United States as well across various areas, including trade, investment, and security. Hence, using Egypt and Ethiopia, the additional BRICS member states, as footholds, China is both increasing cooperation and thereby seeking to implement the Chinese model and a China-led inclusive multilateralism system.

To transform into a community of shared destiny with Africa, the Chinese government will aim to diversify partnerships with many regional economic communities across the African continent by harnessing the BRICS Plus platform while expanding political, economic, and security ties even further compared to now. China's ambitious plans are also expected to bring changes to existing strategies towards Africa. China will likely diversify its African strategy to realize its foreign policies by linking existing China-led multilateral cooperation platforms like the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation to BRICS Plus. Highlighting the Belt and Road Initiative and global development initiatives, cooperation with North Africa is expected to expand compared to before, thereby further enhancing China's access and influence across the African continent.

Amidst prolonged US-China conflicts, the importance of Africa for China lies in safeguarding China's political and economic interests, providing a stage for establishing a China-style international order pursued by China as well as expanding its influence internationally. To create such a stage, the Chinese government makes various efforts to expand multilateral cooperation platforms, thereby expanding multilateral cooperation with African countries. In fact, the multilateral cooperation platform between China and Africa can be seen as bilateral relations with African countries having transitioned into multilateral cooperation since the 1950s. That is, China's diplomacy towards Africa expanded in the past through various means, including diverse multilateral cooperation platforms, and currently, China is pursuing a winwin strategy with Africa as a community of common destiny. However, amidst recent U.S.-China conflicts, cooperation with Africa is being utilized to safeguard China's core interests. In the competitive structure with the United States, to take the lead in renewable energy and battery-related eco-friendly businesses, the Chinese government is actively leveraging Africa to obtain rare earth metals and minerals from African countries.

In this way, with each passing year, China-Africa relations are gradually reconfiguring the international community in the direction led by China. For the community of shared destiny with Africa through multilateral cooperation to lead to genuine mutual benefits and a win-

win relationship in the future, what is urgently needed is not prioritizing Chinese characteristics, but values and norms that China and Africa can empathize with together. Cooperation with Africa through the Belt and Road Initiative also desperately requires efforts to lead to co-development with African countries rather than securing legitimacy for China's Belt and Road Initiative and safeguarding China's core interests.

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Session 2 Navigating Africa – Beyond Statehood

AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE ON MARITIME SECURITY IN THE EMERGING GLOBAL ORDER: A FOCUS ON THE RED SEA

I. Introduction

The geopolitical and geo-economic significance of the Red Sea

This article presents a broad framework for scholarly research on maritime security in the Red Sea region, focusing on Africa's role in the evolving global maritime order. It provides a comprehensive analysis of the strategic significance of the Red Sea, not only as a critical conduit for international commerce, especially to and from the Suez Canal, but also as a critical player in regional stability due to its proximity to areas of conflict and its relevance to various African and Middle Eastern nations. It tries to shed light on a spectrum of security issues prevalent in the Red Sea, including piracy, human and drug trafficking, illegal fishing, and territorial conflicts. Moreover, the article delves into how regional turmoil affects maritime security and examines opportunities and challenges arising from the geo-strategic importance of the Red Sea and its surrounding fragile states. The article also explores the historical factors that have influenced maritime security in Africa while emphasizing the contributions and collaborations of regional bodies and the international community in addressing these challenges.

Despite its importance, the concept of maritime security does not have a universally accepted definition, which hampers the development of effective strategies. While the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) addresses aspects of marine security issues¹, it does not explicitly define 'maritime security². According to Bueger, maritime security issues can be divided into four areas: environmental, economic, national, and human security³ According to Gosnell (2010), maritime security is an obligation that maritime areas be free, safe, and accessible

to all authorized sea users within the context of national, regional, and international governance systems.⁴

In Africa, evolving maritime security challenges have led to enhanced regional cooperation and changes in the security architecture. In Africa, there has been a historical bias towards national and military interests in maritime policies, overshadowing the importance of economic and human security. This military-centric approach is inadequate and ignores the multifaceted nature of maritime threats.⁵

The rise of piracy along the East Coast of Africa shifted attention to maritime concerns and underscored the impact of piracy on human security. While the Yaounde Declaration expanded the scope of maritime crimes in West Africa⁶, it was in the 2050 Africa Integrated Maritime Strategy (AIM Strategy) that a comprehensive, sea-focused approach to human security emerged in Africa's overall strategy⁷. This shift represents a changing understanding of security within the African context, recognizing the importance of maritime domains in human security.

The Red Sea is a crucial global trade route, facilitating the movement of goods worth approximately \$700 billion annually⁸. It carries a significant portion of Europe-Asia maritime trade. In addition, it plays a central role in the competition for hydrocarbon resources in the eastern Mediterranean and Africa. This competition is characterized by US-China rivalry, with the US seeking to counter China's potential dominance in the resource extraction sector and regional tensions among nations such as Egypt, Israel, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Turkey.

The strategic importance of the Red Sea is expected to grow due to broader geo-economic trends and the ongoing contest for commercial, political, and security influence in the connected Indian Ocean and Mediterranean regions. The vulnerability of the Red Sea is underscored by its critical chokepoints, namely the Suez Canal in the north and the Bab-al-Mandeb Strait in the south⁹. Gaining control of these two points, which could be achieved through a well-executed attack, would equate to controlling international shipping and would have severe consequences for the global economy¹⁰. Rerouting shipping lanes around the Cape of Good Hope off South Africa, the only alternative to the Red Sea, would triple the distance and expose shipping to new security vulnerabilities.¹¹ Moreover, damage to the essential infrastructure along the Red Sea could lead to significant political, security, and economic ramifications. Given the recent increase in coastal infrastructure development among Middle Eastern countries, control over these strategic assets has intensified¹².

However, the security landscape in the Red Sea routes in East Africa is experiencing significant transformations driven by various factors. Pirates now engage in more sophisticated and purposeful criminal acts such as robbery and kidnapping for ransom, target specific types of vessels, and have improved information about merchant ships and their cargo. Extremist groups like Al-Shabab exploit lawless coastal areas to conduct attacks, including using captured vessels as weapons¹³. In addition to piracy concerns, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden face emerging threats such as human and weapons trafficking, the use of "bomb boats," attacks on shipping lines, remote seizure of navigation systems, hacked controls of oil pipelines¹⁴, and cutting undersea cables that could disrupt up to half of the world's internet access¹⁵. Recent incidents, such as those involving the MV Muskie on May 31, 2017, and the MV Galicia Spirit on October 25, 2016, near the Bab al-Mandeb (BAM) strait, highlight the region's changing nature of maritime threats. On January 6, 2018, two incidents occurred approximately 45 nautical miles off the port of Al Hudaydah, Yemen¹⁶. These incidents were instigated by groups operating in Southern Yemen¹⁷ and, in both cases, involved armed speedboats and unscrewed boats approaching commercial

ships. The incidents highlight the ongoing threats in the region and the need for international efforts to address maritime security.

Governance challenges in Somalia¹⁸ and Yemen have a massive contribution to piracy and smuggling in the region¹⁹. The increase in transnational smuggling and migration, facilitated by established routes outside state control, poses additional security threats. Moreover, the sea lanes in the Gulf of Aden and adjacent high seas are crucial corridors for irregular migration and human trafficking. Migrants from Somalia and parts of southeastern Ethiopia are transported from jumping-off points along the Somali coast to the coastlines of Yemen and Saudi Arabia²⁰. Given demographic pressures and limited opportunities, young Africans are vulnerable to recruitment by smuggling networks²¹. These are another form of transnational maritime criminal activity that has received negligible attention.

The ongoing conflict in Yemen and tensions in the nearby sea lanes impact strategic decisionmaking. When viewed from a broader perspective, the area where the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden meet also serves as the western border of a new arena of rivalry between major global powers: the Indian Ocean²². Furthermore, the war has resulted in lawless coastal cities that serve as departure points for small, fast boats regularly targeting cruise ships. In addition, since 2023, the internal dynamics in Yemen, where the Houthis have gained domestic support and recruitment, partly due to their stance on the Palestinian cause, have added layers to the conflict²³, making it a challenging international security issue.

Houthi attacks in the Red Sea have become a significant development in the ongoing conflict in Yemen and the broader Middle East²⁴. These attacks primarily target commercial shipping vessels, and the Houthis claim that their attacks are retaliatory measures against Israel's "crimes in Gaza" and have pledged to continue their military operations until Israel ceases its activities in Gaza and

allows for the unobstructed flow of essential supplies like food, medicine, and fuel to the besieged population²⁵. The escalated attacks in the Red Sea have raised severe international concerns due to the disruption of major global trade routes²⁶. A maritime protection force led by the United States has been established to address Houthi attacks and ensure safe navigation²⁷. However, the Houthi group has shown resilience and determination to persist with their military operations, highlighting the complex nature of the issue. This ongoing challenge creates tension in the already disrupted geopolitical landscape.

II. The Red Sea Maritime Security and Global Trade

The Red Sea, an essential maritime corridor that connects the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian Ocean and extends to the Pacific, has had historical significance as a strategic and economic lifeline. Its importance is so great that a US defense official once described it as the "interstate-95% of the planet," emphasizing its global importance²⁸.

The Red Sea's status as a global maritime security concern is grounded in its vital economic importance and the impact of security challenges on international trade and development. The Red Sea serves as a crucial artery for global trade²⁹. It is strategically significant as it facilitates the flow of goods between European and Asian markets. More than 10% of world trade moves through the Red Sea basin annually, which is expected to rise due to the expansion of the Suez Canal's capacity. The Red Sea's role as a critical waterway for trade underpins its global importance, making its security a matter of international concern.

Moreover, Cybersecurity in the Red Sea region is a critical concern due to undersea cables that supply a third of the world's internet service³⁰. Disruption to these cables, such as the incident off the coast of Egypt, poses a severe threat to regional stability and the global economy. Cyberattacks in this region have varied, ranging from email scams to more sophisticated hacking of Gulf

pipelines. The advancement of autonomous shipping increases the risk, as it opens up the possibility of ships being remotely hijacked by hackers. This vulnerability highlights the importance of robust cybersecurity measures to protect these vital communication links.³¹

In recent times, however, this crucial region has become increasingly entangled in the complex geopolitical rivalry of the Gulf states and nations in the Horn of Africa. This escalating competition has added to the existing turmoil in the area, exacerbating tensions and complicating regional dynamics.

With the longest mainland coastline in Africa and proximity to some of the busiest global shipping lanes, Somalia's maritime domain can potentially significantly propel the nation's socio-economic progress³². Nonetheless, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) faces challenges in efficiently managing this space, a concern underscored by ongoing piracy issues³³. Many perceive piracy as not a wholly resolved threat but rather a latent risk, partly due to unregulated fishing by foreign vessels in Somali waters. Although the deployment of international naval forces in the Horn of Africa region has effectively curtailed piracy, its impact on broader maritime security concerns remains limited. Somalia continues to be perceived as a hub for terrorism, piracy, human trafficking, and smuggling activities. This negative reputation impedes the country's commercial efforts to exploit its marine resources and poses significant obstacles to its stabilization efforts³⁴.

Influential maritime security forces and awareness have resulted in a rise in illicit activities in the region. Illegal trafficking in Yemen presents a significant challenge, involving not just firearms and explosives but also components and precursors for weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The profits from smuggling Somali charcoal and sugar by sea are believed to support terrorism. Additionally, the failure of both countries to patrol the area effectively and prevent crimes is consistently identified as a critical factor contributing to instability³⁵.

The strategic significance of the Red Sea, coupled with these contemporary geopolitical challenges, emphasizes its enduring importance in international relations and global trade. It also underscores the delicate balance required to maintain stability in a critical and historically contested region.

III. International Collaboration and Major Power Involvement in the Red Sea

Since 2007, there has been a notable shift in the international community's approach to maritime security in the Horn of Africa³⁶. This response has involved various initiatives and substantial resource allocation. The international reaction to maritime insecurity in the Horn of Africa, especially Somali piracy, has engaged legal, military, and non-state actors' initiatives. While this response has decreased piracy incidents, it also underscores the need for comprehensive strategies to address broader maritime security challenges in the region.

The global community's efforts have primarily concentrated on Somali piracy, mainly due to its significant impact on crucial international shipping lanes and economic implications. Accordingly, international conventions such as UNCLOS of 1982 and the Geneva Convention of 1958 frame the legal response to piracy. Both conventions recognize piracy as a crime of universal jurisdiction, allowing states to act against piracy in international waters. However, there are limitations to these conventions, including their narrow definition of piracy and applicability only in international waters.³⁷ Moreover, the United Nations has passed several resolutions since 2008, creating a framework for states and multilateral actors to undertake measures against piracy. These resolutions, while emphasizing capacity building in Somalia, have maintained a focus on a securitized approach to piracy without granting a mandate to target illegal fishing and waste dumping in Somali waters.³⁸ Furthermore, various naval and military operations have been

significant in combating piracy; deploying naval forces from Europe, China, and India has also been crucial in the region.

Interpol is also involved in the efforts against piracy; it established a Maritime Piracy Task Force in January 2010. The Task Force focuses on improving evidence collection, facilitating information exchange, and increasing the capacities of police investigation units and personnel deployed against pirates.³⁹ In addition, private security firms and NGOs have played vital roles in anti-piracy efforts⁴⁰.

Moreover, the involvement of major powers in the Red Sea maritime security activities presents challenges and opportunities. Countries such as the United States, China, France, and Britain have a considerable presence in the region through their military bases in Djibouti, with frequent patrol across Red Sea routes. Establishing bases by these significant powers demonstrates global military interest in the Red Sea. The P5 of the UN Security Council, namely China, France, Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom, have either established bases or have plans to do so in strategically important locations like Djibouti or Sudan⁴¹. The Red Sea's crucial role in Sino-European trade and its position as a gateway between Africa and the Middle East are influential factors contributing to the militarization of this region⁴². The presence of these bases reflects ongoing rivalry among great powers in the area. Djibouti has attracted Western powers and regional actors like Turkey and the UAE, who seek to establish and enhance their geopolitical footholds.

These dynamics raise questions about the balance of power in the Red Sea⁴³. While competition may lead to tensions, it also presents opportunities for collaboration in stabilizing the region. The military activities of global powers significantly influence regional security. The region's history of conflict and current geopolitical maneuvers by regional powers, such as Saudi Arabia and the

UAE, and global actors, such as China and the United States, indicate ongoing strategic competition for influence and control in the Red Sea. China's establishment of its first-ever overseas military base in Djibouti⁴⁴, close to Western bases, has drawn attention to Beijing's economic investments in the region and raised concerns about its expanding global aspirations.

Generally, the strategic interests of major powers create challenges and opportunities in the Red Sea. This situation influences regional and global maritime security and trade, highlighting the need for a careful balance between national interests and regional stability. These powers' militarization of the Red Sea affects naval security and the flow of global trade. The region's stability is crucial for the smooth operation of vital shipping lanes, particularly for oil and commercial goods. Therefore, the actions of these powers in the Red Sea have implications for international trade, economic growth, and the political landscape of surrounding countries.

IV. The Red Sea Maritime Security Issues and Africa's Perspective

a. Historical events shaping maritime security in Africa

Maritime activities are crucial for the economic vitality of the globe, often pivotal in food selfsufficiency and Human Security. Africa, the second-largest continent in the world, shares borders with the Mediterranean Sea, the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the Atlantic Ocean. Of its 54 nations, 38 are coastal or island nations. The continent is globally recognized for its abundant natural resources, making it the wealthiest continent.

The phrase "no shipping, no shopping" accurately illustrates the essential nature of sea-based trade for every nation, even those without coastlines⁴⁵. African ports handle significant imports and exports, traditionally focusing on natural resources such as gold, diamonds, fish, and agricultural

products. However, there is a growing trend in exporting manufactured goods and artisanal products, highlighting the need for secure sea routes for global market access. Additionally, marine fisheries are vital for food supply in many African countries, with fish serving as a primary source of protein. Therefore, disruptions in maritime access or environmental damage to fisheries impact the economy and threaten national food supplies and the countries' sovereignty.

Despite such vital contributions, African security has primarily focused on land-based conflicts, land occupation, and resource exploitation neglecting maritime threats and protecting maritime areas.⁴⁶ This is evident in the absence of any mention of seas or inland waters in the 1963 Charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) or the 2002 Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU). Bueger notes that African security policy needs to pay more attention to maritime security⁴⁷. On the other hand, Engel observes that maritime security is a relatively new field in the continent⁴⁸.

Despite having extensive maritime zones, most African countries do not have strong naval forces or coast guard capabilities for law enforcement⁴⁹. This deficiency leaves vast maritime areas unprotected and open to exploitation. It was only towards the end of the Cold War, with a shift from traditional to human security, that several African states began to recognize the impact of the marine environment on state economic development⁵⁰.

b. AU's Policy on Maritime Security

The African Union (AU) views human security as a multifaceted concept encompassing human development and human rights⁵¹. This understanding of human security is consistent across the AU's key documents, including those concerning maritime security. The AU's approach to security in Africa is rooted in human security, as demonstrated in early documents like the Constitutive Act of the AU in 2001⁵².

Throughout history, Africa has primarily focused on human security issues related to land⁵³, such as establishing the African Standby Force (ASF) and collaborations with organizations like NATO, specifically the East Africa Standby Force (EASF). The Constitutive Act addresses grave crimes like war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity, typically associated with land-based conflicts.

The Lomé Charter, the AU's most recent policy on maritime security, aims to promote peace, security, stability, environmental protection, trade, and development in African maritime spaces⁵⁴. Its success depends on the definition of 'maritime security,' which aligns with Bueger's four themes: marine environment, economic development, national security, and human security⁵⁵.

The 2050 African Integrated Maritime Strategy (AIM Strategy) emphasizes economic and human security while acknowledging national security, suggesting that the Lomé Charter should adopt a similar focus. However, existing maritime security documents like the 2009 Revised African Maritime Transport Charter and the Djibouti Code of Conduct primarily focus on maritime transport, safety, piracy, and transnational crimes. However, the Jeddah Amendment to the Djibouti Code represents a shift to human security and the blue economy⁵⁶. Implementing these documents with land and sea initiatives that address the root causes of insecurity through human development would be more effective. The Lomé Charter, intended to enforce the 2050 AIM Strategy, is expected to prioritize development. However, training, capacity building, and improving social welfare are not well-covered. Strong political will and effective leadership are necessary for its implementation⁵⁷. Despite 31 countries signing the Charter, its ratification and implementation remain challenging.

A key obstacle to this cooperation is the entrenched notion of state sovereignty⁵⁸. The success of the Lomé Charter relies on member states coordinating their maritime security efforts. Regional

Economic Communities (RECs) have different security concerns, with states prioritizing risks that affect their interests. Africa's history shows the negative consequences of fragmented regional approaches⁵⁹, as seen in conflicts in the Horn of Africa.

The success of the Charter in addressing maritime insecurity depends on various uncertain factors. The African Union (AU) and its member states must set ambitious goals and develop practical strategies to enhance maritime security⁶⁰. While the AIM Strategy has clear goals, it needs more legal authority. The Lomé Charter provides the legal framework for implementing the Strategy's human security and developmental aspirations. To achieve success, the Lomé Charter requires a comprehensive and cooperative approach, strong political commitment, and a shift in focus to holistic development and regional security strategies⁶¹.

c. Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD)

Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) is a regional block in the Horn of Africa Five of its members have a coastline (Somalia (with a coastline of 3,025 km), Eritrea (2234 km), Sudan (853 km), Kenya (536 km), and Djibouti (314 km), while South Sudan, Ethiopia, and Uganda are landlocked but access the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean via the territories of the aforementioned countries therefore, a significant portion of the population relies on the marine domain for their livelihood. The region's trade primarily relies on the sea, with crucial maritime zones such as the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden playing a vital role⁶².

IGAD adopted its Maritime Safety & Security Strategy (IMSS 2015-2030) on December 15, 2015. It focuses on evaluating the regional maritime domain and addressing challenges related to maritime security strategy⁶³. It remains the guiding instrument for developing IGAD Member States 'capacity for maritime safety and security. The IGAD Security Sector Programme (IGAD SSP) Maritime Security Pillar, established in May 2013, assesses the regional maritime domain and identifies each Member State's maritime priorities, concerns, and requirements. A key objective is to implement the 2015-2030 IGAD Integrated Maritime Strategy (IMS), which encompasses the aspirations of the AU 2009 Maritime Transport Charter and the AIM 2050 strategy and strives to create a robust marine and maritime sector in the IGAD region⁶⁴.

However, the Maritime Pillar of IGAD SSP has met challenges in addressing the region's diverse maritime needs and integrating its strategies with broader regional security initiatives. These difficulties arose due to the region's instability, including political turbulence, territorial disputes, piracy, illegal fishing, and trafficking that undermine efforts towards maritime security and impede the effective implementation of security policies. There needs to be more clarity between the policy framework and its practical execution, which can be attributed to varying levels of commitment and capacity challenges among IGAD member states. This fact hinders unified action and poses significant challenges to enforcing maritime security policies and monitoring extensive maritime areas.

d. The Red Sea Forum

The Forum was established in 2020 by "the Red Sea Littoral States" in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, Sudan, Djibouti, Eritrea, and Somalia become members of this newly established forum. This forum connects the African and Arabian states adjacent to the Red Sea. It is expected to aid in convening a forum in the case of a security event in the Red Sea region that could effectively manage the problem, prevent further escalation, and coordinate an

appropriate response⁶⁵. In the context of a post-war transition in Yemen, the importance of such a forum becomes even more pronounced.

However, establishing the Red Sea Forum to address regional needs has faced challenges due to its restrictive "Littoral states only" membership policy. IGAD and AU wanted some institutional cooperation with the Red Sea Forum. IGAD, in particular, has actively sought engagement with the forum, given that half of its members are also part of IGAD. However, most members of the Red Sea need to be more welcoming of these broader institutions. Egypt, the key initiator of the forum, excluded non-littoral states⁶⁶ like Ethiopia, a country only 60km away from the Red Sea coast, for geopolitical reasons. This exclusion has sparked resentment from Ethiopia and some East African states, who have advocated for some form of institutional arrangement allowing them to participate in the forum's activities. Like the UAE, the Gulf States also highly feel this resentment and face the same exclusion.

If inclusive and effectively structured, the forum offers a vital opportunity to address a broad spectrum of regional interests, including peace and security⁶⁷. It offers an opportunity for greater cooperation and less reliance on the patron-client model states⁶⁸. Both coastal states and the Horn would greatly benefit from engaging in collaborative dialogue, particularly on the migration flows, marking a step towards a new regional order involving the Gulf and the Horn of Africa.

e. Challenges for inter-African collaboration on maritime security

A predominant capacity challenge throttling collective maritime security cooperation in Africa stems from stark asymmetry in abilities to secure extensive EEZs, choked surveillance systems, and limited enforcement platforms constraining threat monitoring and responses from illegal fishing to trafficking rackets exploiting turmoil as evident in Bight of Benin piracy.⁶⁹ Large

coastlines, such as Namibia's 1.6 million square kilometer EEZ and Kenya's more than 2700 nautical miles, highlight the major resource and capacity shortages that African coastal regions face.

Bureaucratic fragmentation also hinders coordination with multiple agencies from environment, and ports to navies overseeing distinct functions and policies despite possessing poor intra-agency communication. Such disconnects defeated earlier Gulf of Guinea frameworks until the 2013 Yaounde Architecture introduced improved information-sharing processes target hardening against further external shocks.⁷⁰ Interstate tensions driven by economic nationalisms and unresolved territorial disputes similarly complicate waters like the Zambezi Delta encouraging unilateral exploitation over joint conservation allowing IUU syndicates to ease maritime crimes.

The absence of enforcement unity due to disjointed legal regimes across adjacent maritime boundaries also advantages malicious actors. Differences whether in acceptable hot pursuit duration for foreign forces or restrictions over piracy classifications impede coordinated deterrence in African regional waters as scholars highlight.⁷¹ Universal ratification and harmonizing such statutes can enable collective deterrence against maritime threats through unified application, interpretations, and asset pooling.

Without sustained investments in capabilities upgrading, maritime domain awareness systems integration, and policy harmonization, African maritime governance institutions risk being outpaced by rapidly evolving threats whether non-state militant networks or globalized trafficking cartels undercutting the rule of law at sea. Hence elevating maritime security cooperation requires renewed priority across interlinked domestic, regional and continental levels.

V. Discussions and Conclusion

The security situation in the Red Sea is intertwined with the broader geopolitical dynamics of the Middle East and Africa⁷². Rivalries among African countries, the broader regional conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and the involvement of global powers add complexity to the Red Sea's security landscape. These tensions and rivalries have implications for maritime security in the region, as they can potentially escalate into broader conflicts that threaten the stability of this crucial naval corridor.

The growing attacks on ships in the Red Sea by the Houthi rebels from Yemen have led to heightened concerns for global supply chains. The presence of the Iranian warship in the Red Sea⁷³, following US Navy actions against Houthi vessels, signifies the potential for further escalation. This situation has caused significant shipping companies to alter routes, increasing costs and insurance premiums. The global economic implications are substantial, with the possibility of continued escalation posing risks to shipping costs, oil prices, and the fragile recovery from high inflation⁷⁴.

Involvement from the Horn countries like Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea, and Djibouti adds more complexity. Djibouti's strategic position at the entrance to the Red Sea has made it a hub for international military bases and a critical point for maritime security. Military bases from global powers such as the United States, China, and France emphasize Djibouti's significance in Red Sea security.

As a landlocked nation, Ethiopia's access to the Red Sea is critical, relying on ports in neighboring Djibouti, Eritrea, and Somaliland for import-export activities⁷⁵. Eritrea's strategic location along the Red Sea coast is vital for Ethiopia's maritime trade routes. The peace agreement between

Eritrea and Ethiopia has eased border tensions, but the maritime domain remains a potential source of contention.

The recent inking of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Ethiopia and Somaliland on January 1, 2024, to establish a naval base and use Berbera's port has brought regional implications⁷⁶. The agreement enables Ethiopia to diversify its seaport access, reducing its reliance on Djibouti and enhancing its strategic position with direct access to the Red Sea. Analysts view this MoU as a strategic and diplomatic triumph for Ethiopia and a peaceful and pragmatic solution to Ethiopia's landlocked dilemma, offering mutual benefits to Ethiopia and Somaliland ⁷⁷. However, the agreement also implies recognizing Somaliland as an independent entity, separate from Somalia, leading to a wide range of controversies⁷⁸. The new development holds broader implications for the Horn of Africa, especially considering the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait's strategic significance. The analysis warns against escalating geopolitical imbalances in the already turmoil region and stresses the need for diplomatic efforts to prevent instability⁷⁹.

The involvement of the Gulf States in the Horn of Africa political transitions, along with the increased interest of global powers, is reshaping the region's geopolitical dynamics. The maritime security in the Red Sea, especially considering the involvement of the major powers and regional dynamics, posits both opportunities and challenges for African maritime security in the emerging global order. While this competition provides economic opportunities, it poses risks and vulnerabilities for regional states.

African nations must adopt a more comprehensive approach toward maritime security that goes beyond military strategies. The AU's over-reliance on military policies disregards the diverse impacts of maritime threats on economic and human development and fails to address the multifaceted nature of such threats. Given the diverse effects of maritime security issues on various African states and actors, the one-size-fits-all approach is also inefficient⁸⁰. African nations need a shared understanding of maritime security to develop a cohesive regional strategy⁸¹. Moving forward, Africa must shift its focus towards an all-inclusive approach that integrates economic development and human security to secure its maritime domain effectively. Such a comprehensive strategy would tackle immediate security challenges and promote long-term stability and prosperity in Africa's maritime environment.

Weak maritime governance and a lack of robust regional naval security have contributed to piracy and other maritime insecurities. This problem is rooted in inadequate governance and security systems of coastal states. The regional states and IGAD have yet to establish effective systems or frameworks to oversee activities in their maritime territories⁸².

In conclusion, the Red Sea's status as a global maritime concern is thus shaped by global and regional actors' economic, political, and security interests and broader international geopolitical interests. The interconnected nature of these issues necessitates a coordinated approach to ensure the security of this vital maritime corridor. Security challenges in the Red Sea and East African maritime routes are interconnected with political, economic, and social issues on land. Responding to these challenges involves international cooperation and a multifaceted approach to address immediate threats and root causes.

VI. Policy Implications and the way forward

AU and Africa: African countries must navigate these complex dynamics carefully, particularly those in the Horn of Africa and along the Red Sea. Policies should ensure the security and openness

of their maritime domains for trade. Collaborative efforts, such as the Djibouti Code of Conduct/Jeddah Amendment, offer platforms for regional cooperation. Engaging in these platforms could help African states address evolving security threats in the Red Sea and ensure the safety and security of navigation in this essential region.

There exist a number of possible strategies for African countries to safeguard interests amid geopolitical tensions. The first essential strategy entails upholding Pan-African multilateralism and rejecting unilateralism in securing African maritime spaces. Joint continental platforms allow the amplification of limited capabilities through improved surveillance coordination, patrols, and response capacity pooling. Inter-state policy harmonization around issues from port standards to information-sharing protocols also enhances resilience against external shocks and probes.

Moreover, African states and regional organizations must work towards establishing a unified approach to securing the Red Sea. The AU should prioritize Africa's maritime domain and implement the Africa Integrated Maritime Strategy 2050. While progress has been made at various levels, the AU has yet to demonstrate interest in consolidating these efforts for a comprehensive approach to African maritime security. Regional Economic Communities (RECs) should assist member states in conducting scientific and economic studies to understand the value of their maritime domains and explore the potential for sustainable and responsible development. Collaborations among regional and international players are crucial to safeguarding maritime security in the Red Sea.

The IGAD Sub Region: IGAD and its member states should focus on enhancing regional collaboration, increasing resource allocation, and prioritizing capacity building. This focus is essential for effectively monitoring and enforcing maritime security policies. Leveraging member states in the Red Sea Forum and securing direct membership would be a key strategy. Additionally,

consistent international funding and technical support are vital to address resource constraints faced by IGAD.

De-escalating the tensions in the Gulf region would significantly alleviate regional strains, fostering an environment more conducive to productive engagement. This reduction in tensions would allow Gulf states and their African allies to engage more effectively in forums and discussions, free from partisan limitations⁸³. By adopting a stance of collaboration and constructive dialogue in the Horn of Africa, Gulf states can build stronger, more positive regional relationships. This approach could lead to more stable and mutually advantageous outcomes for all parties involved, underscoring the importance of diplomatic efforts and regional cooperation.

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Climate Mobility in the Context of Urbanisation

a case study from Ethiopia

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Contents


- 1. An Overview of Climate Mobility Debates
- A Systematic Review of Literature on the Relationships between Climate Change, Migration and Urban Development from 2011 to 2020
- 3. A Case Study of Young Ethiopian Smallholders Heading to Addis Ababa
- 4. Policy Implications





An Overview of Climate Mobility Debates

- Public interest in climate migration has dramatically increased.
- Climate migration continues to be perceived in overly simple terms.
- The continuing popularity of 'climate refugees' narratives



Frequency of the set of keywords – 'climate' and 'migration' – being searched for the period 2001–2019 by year (Source: Google Ngram Viewer, 26 May 2021)

The emergence of the term 'climate mobility' reflects that people's movements are multicausal and multidirectional.

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Systematic Review of Literature

- What is systematic review?
- Over 1,000 publications published between 2011 and 2022 considered, and a subset of 173 selected/reviewed in depth
- > A clear shift towards climate-related migration into cities
- > An emphasis on capital/large cities
- Fast-onset climate change for South Asia and slow-onset climate change for Sub-Saharan Africa





A Case Study of Ethiopia

- Young Ethiopian Smallholders going to cities for temporary jobs as unskilled labourers during the off-farm season (Nov Feb).
- Environment: Increasingly frequent and intense drought events
- Non-environment: Rural land tenure (land scarcity and the state ownership), existing rural—rural movements to large-scale farms affected by climate change and ethnic conflicts
- > Urban issues: citizenship, living conditions and job security





Policy Implications

- The weak position of young smallholder farmers embedded between rural and urban socio-economic systems and their vulnerability to recurrent droughts
- > Land tenure systems to be more flexible
- The informality and temporality of climate mobility to be addressed in the urban policy contexts







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TSU TRANSPORT

Socio-Economic Gaps and Migration Conflicts in Africa

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Global Challenges on Refugee Supports

- 2015 Europe Refugee Crisis
 - Syria Refugee Crisis
 - Rise of Anti-Migration/Refugee Atmosphere
 - EU Norms vs. Domestic Politics
- 2022 Britain Rwanda Refugee Treaty
 - Transport 'illegal' asylum seekers in GB to Rwanda
 - Financial compensation to Rwanda
 - Criticism on human rights violation and supporting dictatorship

Refugee Norms

- 1951 UN Refugee Convention
- 1967 UN Refugee Protocol
- 2015 UN Sustainable Development Goals
- 2019 Global Refugee Compact

OAU Refugee Convention (1969)

- The Organization of African Unity Refugee Convention
- Recognition of refugees by external threats
- Recognition of refugees as groups
 - If you are from the region in crisis, you can be recognized as asylum seekers or refugees
 - In-depth document proof or interviews are not mandatory
 - Rapid recognition by the crisis
 - More centralized humanitarian aid to the camps or settlement
 - More effective to deal with mass influx
- More advanced refugee protection mechanism than UN

Refugees in East Africa

- Underdeveloped hosting countries
- Foreign id dependent to host refugees
- Protracted refugee situations
- Hosting more than 2/3 global refugees before Syria crisis
- Cultural similarities between hosting communities and refugees
- Culture of hospitality
- Lack of border security

Hosting countries: Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania Origin countries: Somalia, South Sudan, DR Congo, Burundi

Hosting countries are:

- More stable in politics
- More economic development
- Better and more jobs with higher wages
- Better government capability on climate change

Refugees are seeking for:

- Survival, literally
- More security
- Better livelihoods
- Paradox of Group Protection Norm

If your country faces a crisis such as a civil war or natural disaster, the OAU Refugee Treaty yields you a corridor to cross the border: asylum seeker.

- 1. Uganda South Sudan
- Land cultivation and cattle farming
- In 2000s, refugee-welcoming atmosphere in host communities
 - Protect refugees from the war
 - Africa culture of hospitality
- In 2020s, worsened local perception on refugees
 - Climate change and drought
 - Conflicts over water, grass, food
 - Increased temporal migrations of South Sudanese
 - Come to Uganda during dry seasons
 - Go back to South Sudan on needs

- 2. Tanzania Burundi
- 1972 Burundi Refugee Crisis
- 1993-1995 Great Lakes Region Refugee Crisis
- 2015 Burundi Refugee Crisis
- Anti-refugee atmosphere since 1995
- Fake refugee controversy
 - Economic purpose of refugees
 - Small NGO's means of survive

Fake Refugee Controversy

- Suspecting 'real' intention of refugees
 - Job finders or refugees?
 - Cherry pickers?
- Recognizing refugees as their origin
 - Domestic crisis as opportunity to cross border
- Some mal-behavior of minor NGOs
 - Refugee crisis as means of survival
- Governments' political assets to blame worsened performance

Conclusion

- Socio-Economic gaps among neighboring countries motivate people in lower level countries to voluntarily migrate to the higher ones.
- It triggers 'fake refugee controversy' which may deepen negative perception on 'real' refugees in hosting communities.